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When the Government Is the Controlling
Shareholder
Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock*
As a result of the 2008 bailouts, the U.S. government became the
controlling shareholder of some major U.S. corporations: AIG, Citigroup,
GM, GMAC, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac. Corporate law provides a
complex and comprehensive set of standards of conduct to protect noncontrolling shareholders from controlling shareholders who have goals other
than maximizing firm value. In this Article, we analyze the extent to which
these existing corporate law structures of accountability apply when the government is the controlling shareholder and the extent to which federal
“public law” structures substitute for displaced state “private law” norms.
We show that the Delaware restrictions on controlling shareholders are
largely displaced, but hardly replaced, by federal provisions. Having concluded that the existing accountability structures do not provide sufficient
protection of minority-shareholder interests, we examine the variety of ways
(in the United States and elsewhere) in which government ownership has
been structured in order to minimize political interference at the expense of
noncontrolling shareholders, including nonvoting stock, independent
directors, dedicated trusts, and separate management companies. Because
neither ex ante legal structures nor ex post judicial review hold much promise for controlling political interference, we are left with a choice between
developing new structures of accountability and bringing this anomalous era
of government control to a speedy conclusion. As the U.S. Treasury moves
forward with its plans for taking some of these companies public again,
understanding the legal restrictions on the government as controlling
shareholder is critically important to the decision to buy shares in an IPO
and, if so, at what price.

* Marcel Kahan is the George T. Lowy Professor of Law at NYU Law School. Edward Rock
is the Saul A. Fox Distinguished Professor of Business Law at the University of Pennsylvania Law
School. We are grateful for comments from Bill Allen, Heitor Almeida, Ed Baker, and Cathie
Struve, and to workshop and conference participants at Harvard, Hebrew University, NYU, Penn,
Stanford, and Yale. Thanks to Andrew Egan, Natus Navrat, Stephen Pratt, and Michal Yevnin for
research help. Marcel Kahan would also like to thank the Milton and Miriam Handler Foundation
for financial support. Edward Rock’s research was supported by the University of Pennsylvania’s
Institute for Law and Economics and the Saul A. Fox Research Endowment.

1294

I.
II.

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 89:1293

Introduction ....................................................................................... 1295
Some Recent Background ................................................................. 1299
A. The Government’s Holdings in Private Companies: Some
Numbers ........................................................................................ 1299
1. Voting Stock and Control Positions. ......................................... 1299
2. Debt and Nonvoting Stock. ....................................................... 1301
B. Some Troubling Anecdotes........................................................... 1301
C. How Did We Get Here? ................................................................ 1307
D. Purpose Versus Effect of Acquiring Stock Position ..................... 1313
III. When the Government Is the Controlling Shareholder: Regulation . 1315
A. The Baseline: The Problems Posed by Ordinary Controlling
Shareholders.................................................................................. 1315
B. The Problem of the Government as a Controlling Shareholder .... 1317
C. Introduction: The Delaware Corporate Law Structure.................. 1319
1. The Duty-of-Loyalty Claim ....................................................... 1319
2. The Duty-of-Care Claim ........................................................... 1320
3. The Duty-of-Good-Faith Claim ................................................ 1322
D. The Direct Challenge: The U.S. Treasury’s Obligations as
Controlling Shareholder ................................................................ 1323
1. Delaware Law and the U.S. Government ................................. 1324
2. Sovereign Immunity and Its Limits: Claims Against the
U.S. Government ....................................................................... 1325
a. Jurisdiction and Venue: The Limitation of Delaware’s Role.1326
b. FTCA Claims. ....................................................................... 1326
i. Is a Breach of Fiduciary Duty a “Tort”?. ..................... 1326
ii. The “discretionary function” exception. ..................... 1330
iii. Are the actions in the hypo choices from “a
range of permissible courses”?. ................................. 1332
c. Potential Tucker Act Fiduciary-Duty Claims ....................... 1336
d. Claims Under the APA .......................................................... 1341
e. Claims Under the Freedom of Information Act .................... 1345
E. An Alternative Strategy: Leaving the U.S. Government Out
of the Suit ...................................................................................... 1346
F. Conclusion .................................................................................... 1346
IV. Structuring Government Ownership Ex Ante ................................... 1347
A. U.S. Models .................................................................................. 1349
1. Chrysler 1.0 .............................................................................. 1349
2. The AIG Structure: An Explicit Trust ....................................... 1351
3. Another U.S. Model: Limited Voting and Predetermined
Exit at Citigroup ....................................................................... 1353

2011]

B.
C.
D.

When the Government Is the Controlling Shareholder

1295

V.

U.K. Financial Investments Limited ............................................. 1354
The Israeli Approach: The 1983 Bank Bailout ............................. 1358
The Design Choices and the Background Politics ........................ 1360
1. Insulation Through Binding Separation ................................... 1361
2. Mandating a Quick Exit ............................................................ 1362
Conclusion ........................................................................................ 1363

I.

Introduction

General Motors has returned to the public capital markets with an initial
public offering of shares. The U.S. Treasury remains and will remain a controlling shareholder of GM for the foreseeable future. To what extent will
Delaware law constrain the federal government in its role as controlling
shareholder? Will GM’s minority shareholders be able to sue the U.S.
Treasury for breach of the duty of loyalty if the Treasury abuses its
controlling position? This Article addresses these and related issues.
Imagine an essay question for next year’s final exam in Corporations:
Some background: The Detroit Motor Corporation (DMC or DM)
is in trouble. Its cost structure is uncompetitive, the quality of its cars
is dubious, and, in the midst of a recession, its sales have dropped
dramatically. The U.S. government, through the Department of the
Treasury, is determined to rescue it and prepared to take extraordinary
steps to do so. First, the government makes a substantial loan to DM.
Second, it engineers a reorganization by leaning on the major secured
creditors—in whom the Treasury happens to own significant stock
and warrants—to accept less than the unsecured creditors will end up
receiving. In the new DM, the Treasury owns 60% of the common
stock. Hundreds of dealers are terminated. Factories are closed.
Directors and executives are replaced. Wage rates are frozen. Around
the same time, the Treasury rescues the historically related finance
company, Detroit Motors Acceptance Corporation (DMAC), and ends
up with a 56% controlling interest in DMAC.
Now to the heart of the question: Going forward, the Treasury
wants new DM to succeed, both because it believes that the United
States needs to preserve its “domestic” automobile industry (and the
jobs associated with it) and because, after investing $50 billion, the
government wants to get the money back. To further these goals, the
Treasury leans on DMAC to provide financing (on preferential terms)
to DM, to customers who buy DM cars, and to the remaining DM
dealers.
At the same time, the Treasury insists on the following: First, it
wants DM to make DM’s product mix much greener because it
believes that greener cars are the wave of the future. Second, it asks
that no further factories be closed in a set of eight states hit hard by the
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recession and, as it happens, identified by the President’s chief pollster
as most crucial to the President’s chances of winning a second term.
Some of the minority shareholders of DMAC are outraged that
their company is being run for the benefit of DM. They provide
evidence that the preferential terms provided to DM and its dealers
and customers cost DMAC about $500 million per year. They would
like to sue to recover damages already suffered and to prevent these
preferential contracts from continuing. Please advise them on what
claims they can bring, against whom, and how they should proceed.
Address both substantive and procedural aspects.
Some of the minority shareholders of new DM think that going
green will be financially ruinous. They would like to take legal action
to prevent the change or, in the event that it goes forward, wonder if
they will have any remedy if no one wants to buy new DM’s green
cars.
Finally, minority shareholders of DM complain about the fact that
factories slated for closing seemed to be picked on some basis other
than maximizing the corporation’s profits.
Please advise them.

For corporate law, the fact pattern raises several issues.1 First, on
account of the size of its shareholding, the U.S. government would be
considered a “controlling shareholder” of both DM and DMAC and, thus,
would owe fiduciary duties to the respective minority shareholders. All three
requests made by the U.S. government—to have DMAC lend money to DM,
to revise DM’s product mix, and not to have DM close certain factories—
raise fiduciary-duty issues.
As to DMAC, one worries that the Treasury has used its power over
DMAC to benefit another firm in the Treasury’s control, DM, at a cost to the
other shareholders of DMAC.2 In corporate law terms, this raises questions
of self-dealing and the duty of loyalty. At the same time, shareholders of
DM worry that the Treasury is allowing other considerations—reducing
global warming, saving jobs in recession-battered states, or increasing the
President’s reelection chances—to lead the Treasury to force DM into costly
and foolish business decisions that will cost the shareholders huge amounts
of money. This raises issues that would normally be analyzed under the duty
of care and the duty of good faith.
1. It also raises a host of other issues that are beyond the scope of this Article, including the fit
between Chapter 11’s requirements for the approval of a plan of reorganization and the “363 sale”
procedure used in the Chrysler and GM bankruptcies, which poses important and unresolved issues
under bankruptcy law and issues relating to the effect on competitors of the government’s
investments in DM and DMAC. See Mark J. Roe & David Skeel, Assessing the Chrysler
Bankruptcy, 108 MICH. L. REV. 727, 734–36, 746–49 (2010).
2. The background section raises a similar issue with regard to the noncontrolling shareholders
of the TARP banks. See infra subpart II(B).
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In posing the corporate law issues, there is an immediate sense that the
framework does not quite fit the situation. In the normal self-dealing
context, the controlling shareholder enriches itself at the expense of the
noncontrolling shareholders. Here, by contrast, the Treasury leans on
DMAC to help DM in order to further certain public-policy initiatives.
While minority shareholders may well suffer, the Treasury is not lining its
pocket on their backs. Although the minority shareholders may object to the
Treasury furthering public policy at their expense, that is a different
complaint.
The United States does not have much history with government
ownership of private industry.3 As a result, we do not have a well-workedout structure of accountability when the government is the majority holder of
a for-profit corporation. The problems raised are an interesting inverse of the
problems caused by privatization of key governmental functions. When
prisons, public education, or delivery of social-welfare services are
privatized, the normal public law structures of accountability may be
displaced. For constitutional or administrative law protections to apply, the
threshold requirement is typically “state action,” a requirement that may not
be met when services are outsourced to private firms. The challenge to public accountability posed by privatization has produced a large literature that
examines, in various ways, two main questions: First, is it permissible to outsource particular functions, as a matter of constitutional norms or public law
values more generally? Second, if the delegation is permissible, which of the
constitutional or administrative law limits, if any, do or should apply to the
private actor?4 In short, can or should the Constitution or the Administrative
Procedure Act5 (APA) reach private actors providing public services?
When the government becomes a controlling shareholder of a private
firm, we face an inverted set of these issues. Government involvement, as
we will see, changes everything. It immediately raises issues of sovereign
immunity and its various and sundry waivers. It forces corporate law
scholars to venture into the realms of Administrative Law—the content of the
Tucker Act,6 the Federal Tort Claims Act7 (FTCA), and the APA. These
three federal statutes largely displace Delaware’s state law structures of
accountability. A key challenge posed by government involvement is

3. For a review of that history, see J.W. Verret, Treasury Inc.: How the Bailout Reshapes
Corporate Theory and Practice, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 289–93 (2010).
4. For examples of this literature, see generally Jack Beermann, Privatization and Political
Accountability, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1507 (2001); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public
Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (2000); Gillian Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 1367 (2003); Symposium, Public Values in an Era of Privatization, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 1212 (2003); Paul Verkuil, Privatizing Due Process, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 963 (2005).
5. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2006).
6. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1491–1503 (2006).
7. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671–2680 (2006).
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whether the public law approaches to accountability that government involvement imports can, or can be made to, provide the same sort of
protections that have evolved in private law. As we will show, the answer, at
least so far, is largely negative. The consequence of this is that when the
government is an investor, ex post judicial review under the heading of
“fiduciary duties” becomes less effective, and greater attention must be given
to the ex ante governance structures used when the government takes an equity position as well as to the potential virtues of precommitment to early
exit.
Understanding and evaluating the alternative accountability structures
available under public and private law is important for a variety of reasons.
First, we are now in a period of public ownership of controlling positions in
major private firms, and issues may arise. Second, in understanding the
public policy trade-offs involved in decisions to rescue private firms rather
than allowing them to fail, the extent to which public ownership may lead to
“noncommercial” behavior of the firm, or politically motivated behavior by
the controlling shareholder, is a significant factor. Indeed, the resulting
structures of accountability must be taken into account in determining how to
structure the intervention. Third, understanding the strength or weakness of
the constraints on the behavior of the controlling shareholder will be important to those considering investing in controlled firms as those firms seek to
raise additional capital or the government seeks to reduce its stake, as in
GM’s 2010 IPO, and to increase the amount that investors will be willing to
pay.8 Finally, inadequacies of the public law accountability structures may
provide reasons to work for an early exit from this hybrid ownership regime.
If we do not have an adequate regulatory structure when the government is
the controlling shareholder, we can either develop one or, probably better,
sell off the government stakes quickly. Recent developments suggest that the
government is seeking to exit from its ownership positions just as quickly as
it can, consistent with getting an adequate price for its shares.9
In this Article, we examine these issues, the extent to which the existing
structure of legal regulation addresses them, and the extent to which ex ante
transactional structures can prevent them from arising or limit their severity
if they do arise.10 We proceed as follows. In Part I, we review recent events

8. GM made an initial public offering of new stock in November 2010. Sharon Terlep, Randall
Smith & Aaron Lucchetti, GM’s IPO May Raise Record Amount, WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704312504575619004098993666.html.
9. See, e.g., Liz Moyer, Citi Sale Stokes New Trading Dynamic, WALL ST. J., Dec. 7, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703296604576005431476850972.html (discussing
the Treasury’s sale of its 2.4 billion shares in Citigroup stock and the “expected wave of
institutional buying” that followed).
10. For other work on these issues that overlaps to some degree with our analysis here, see
Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Government’s Response to the
Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463, 466 (2009), and Verret, supra note 3, at 285–89.
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during which the U.S. Treasury invested vast sums in private firms, including
both financial and nonfinancial institutions and both publicly traded and privately held corporations, as well as some evidence of politically driven
involvement in the managing of companies.11 In Part II, we examine the
challenges posed to the existing structure of legal regulation of controlling
shareholders when the controlling shareholder is the U.S. Treasury. With
regard to claims against the United States, this requires looking at sovereign
immunity and its exceptions, as developed in the FTCA, the Tucker Act, and
the APA. We also examine the extent to which one could avoid the reach of
sovereign immunity by forgoing suit against the controlling shareholder and
limiting the defendants to the directors of the controlled corporations. In
Part III, we turn to the ex ante governance structures that have been used to
try to control the emergence of these problems. In this context, we look at a
variety of U.S. structures, including the previous Chrysler bailout that relied
on loan guarantees, as well as more recent use of nonvoting stock, share
trusts, and commitments to exit; the United Kingdom’s establishment of the
wholly owned U.K. Financial Investments Limited to hold and manage its
interests in financial institutions bailed out with government funds; and the
mechanism used by Israel after the bank share trading scandal in the 1980s
resulted in government ownership of its banks. Part IV is a conclusion in
which we try to draw preliminary lessons from our recent experience with
government ownership and our comparative analyses.
II.

Some Recent Background

Our starting hypothetical is not simply the product of fevered
imaginations but is based on recent events. In this Part, we briefly review
some of those developments.
A. The Government’s Holdings in Private Companies: Some Numbers
Since the summer of 2008, the government has invested huge sums into
private financial and nonfinancial companies. These investments have taken
a variety of forms including debt, nonvoting stock, voting stock, and
warrants. Although our focus is on the government as controlling
shareholder, the threshold of control is vague. Accordingly, we give a
broader overview of the government’s recent investments.
1. Voting Stock and Control Positions.
 In September 2008, the Treasury invested $85 billion in AIG, in
partial exchange for which it received preferred stock that has
77.9% of the votes and warrants that, if exercised, grant it

11. In describing involvement as “politically driven,” we do not intend a value judgment but
simply to distinguish it from involvement driven by normal financial motives.
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another 2% of the votes.12 If and when the recapitalization
announced on September 30, 2010, is completed, the Treasury
will own approximately 92.1% of AIG common stock.13
At Citigroup, in the wake of the preferred-stock share exchange,
the Treasury owned around 34% of the outstanding common
stock,14 and after Citi’s $17 billion stock issuance, owned 26%.15
During 2010, the Treasury sold off shares so that, by the end of
September 2010, its ownership was down to 12.4%.16 The
Treasury subsequently disposed of its remaining interests.17
As a result of the federally engineered bankruptcy, the United
States owns 8% of the equity in new Chrysler.18
As a result of the GM bailout, the Treasury owned 61% of the
common stock of new GM.19 After GM’s November 2010 IPO,
the Treasury’s stake dropped to 26%.20
The Treasury owns 56% of the common stock of GMAC, GM’s
former financing affiliate.21
The Treasury owns 79.9% of Fannie Mae (FNMA, the Federal
National Mortgage Association) and Freddie Mac (FHLMC, the
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation), the formerly

12. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Sept. 16, 2008), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/other/20080916a.htm. For further details, see
infra notes 240–44 and accompanying text.
13. Pallavi Gogoi & Daniel Wagner, AIG Bailout Exit Doesn’t Resolve Losses from TARP,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Sept. 30, 2010, http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/
D9IIHADO0.htm.
14. Citigroup, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 9 (Nov. 6, 2009).
15. David Enrich & Damian Paletta, Discord Behind TARP Exits, WALL ST. J., Dec. 19, 2009,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703323704574602552053952422.html; see also
Michael Corkery, The Good, Bad, and Ugly of Citigroup’s Botched Stock Sale, WSJ BLOGS (Dec.
17, 2009), http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2009/12/17/the-good-bad-and-ugly-of-citigroups-botchedstock-sale/ (“As a result of that capital raise, taxpayers were diluted from a 33% stake in Citigroup
to 26% . . . .”).
16. U.S. Treasury to Earn $2.25 Billion on Citi Securities, REUTERS (Sept. 30, 2010),
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN3011328720101001.
17. Tom Barkley, TARP Profit on Citigroup: $12.3 Billion, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703293204576105763449264874.html.
18. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Obama Administration Auto Restructuring
Initiative: Chrysler–Fiat Alliance (Apr. 30, 2009), available at http://www.treasury.gov/presscenter/press-releases/Pages/tg115.aspx.
19. See Bill Vlasic & Nick Bunkley, Obama Is Upbeat for G.M. Future on a Day of Pain, N.Y.
TIMES, June 2, 2009, at A1.
20. Michael J. de la Merced & Bill Vlasic, U.S. Recovers Billions in Sale of G.M. Stock, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 17, 2010, at A1.
21. Binyamin Appelbaum, U.S. to Give $3.6 Billion More in Aid to GMAC; Move Makes
Government the Majority Owner of Troubled Auto Lender, WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 2009, at A1.
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“private” government sponsored enterprises (GSEs) that were
the largest mortgage intermediaries.22
2. Debt and Nonvoting Stock.
 Through its Capital Purchase Program (CPP), the Treasury
injected approximately $200 billion of Troubled Asset Relief
Program (TARP) funds into 707 institutions.23 The CPP
investments combine preferred stock with warrants, neither of
which carries votes.
 Through the Targeted Investment Program (TIP), the United
States invested $20 billion in nonvoting preferred stock in Bank
of America that has now been paid back.24
And this is but a partial list of the U.S. government’s investments.
B. Some Troubling Anecdotes
This much federal money could not be invested in private companies
without controversy and without inviting politicians to take a role, directly or
indirectly, in the management of these firms. Even though governmental investment started less than three years ago, there are already some troubling
anecdotes that we summarize in this subpart.
Executive compensation, traditionally a matter for the board and
shareholders, has attracted a lot of attention in Washington. The outcry over
AIG bonuses provides a rich example. After receiving more than $170
billion in bailout funds, AIG announced plans to pay $165 million in bonuses
to executives in the company’s financial products division, the same division
responsible for the collapse of AIG.25 In response, Representative Earl
Pomeroy proclaimed, “Have the recipients of these checks no shame at
all? . . . [AIG bonus recipients] are disgraced professional losers. And by
the way, give us our money back.”26 Others, such as Representative Charles
Rangel, characterized AIG as “getting away with murder,”27 while
Republican Senator Charles Grassley advised AIG bonus recipients to
22. Louise Story, New Aid for Fannie and Freddie, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2009, at B1.
23. Investment Programs: Capital Purchase Program, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, http://www.
treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/investment-programs/cpp/Pages/capitalpurchaseprogram.
aspx.
24. Investment Programs: Targeted Investment Program, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, http://www.
treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/investment-programs/tip/Pages/targetedinvestmentprog
ram.aspx; see also Securities Purchase Agreement Between Bank of America Corp. and U.S. Dep’t
of the Treasury (Jan. 15, 2009), available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financialstability/investment-programs/tip/Documents_Contracts_Agreements/BAC%20III%20Binder.pdf.
25. Edmund L. Andrews & Peter Baker, At A.I.G., Huge Bonuses After $170 Billion Bailout,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2009, at A1.
26. Carl Hulse & David M. Herszenhorn, A.I.G. and Wall St. Confront Upsurge of Populist
Fury, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2009, at A1.
27. Id.
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“[r]esign or go commit suicide.”28 President Obama, in a more measured
response intended to “channel [public] anger in a constructive way,”29 urged
Congress to draft legislation that sends “a strong signal to the executives who
run these firms that such compensation will not be tolerated.”30
But, aside from these predictable and traditional responses to perceived
corporate excess, there are a number of more interesting details that illustrate
the new dynamics made possible by government ownership. Representative
Barney Frank, chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, pushed
the idea of suing AIG to get the bonus money back, pointing out that the federal government owns nearly an 80% stake in the company after giving it
more than $170 billion in aid.31 “I still believe that we have a right legally to
recover this, because we can assert our ownership rights and say, yes, you
may have had a contractual right to a bonus but your rotten performance
means you should forfeit it,” he was quoted as saying.32
Frank’s notion that the government may have more power—or, at least,
different power—as shareholder than as regulator has been picked up by
shareholder activists. At AIG, where a Treasury trust holds 77.9% of the
stock, the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees
(AFSCME) lobbied the three trustees to withhold the trust’s votes from the
AIG director who served on the compensation committee during the period
in which the bonuses were granted, to vote against AIG’s 2008 compensation
in the advisory shareholder vote required of TARP participants, and to support AFSCME’s shareholder proposal requiring that executive equity awards
be held for two years past departure.33
But the attempts to influence portfolio companies have been broader.
Congress expected that bailout funds would stimulate lending and revitalize

28. AIG and the President: Easy Does It, ECONOMIST, Mar. 21, 2009, http://www.economist.
com/opinion/displaystory.cfm?story_id=13326168.
29. Jackie Calmes & Louise Story, A.I.G. Seeking Return of Half of Its Bonuses, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 19, 2009, at A1.
30. Hulse & Herszenhorn, supra note 26; see also Andrew Ross Sorkin et al., U.S. Rounding
Up Investors to Buy Bad Bank Assets, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2009, at A1 (reporting the Obama
Administration’s intent to increase oversight of executive compensation at financial institutions).
On the legislative side, Congress soon responded to the President’s challenge. The House of
Representatives passed a bill that retroactively imposed a 90% tax on bonuses paid after January 1,
2009, for traders and executives earning in excess of $250,000 a year. The bill applied to
companies retaining $5 billion or more in bailout funds. Representative David Camp said of the
legislation, “It is an extreme use of the tax code to correct an extreme and excessive wrong done to
the American taxpayer.” Hulse & Herszenhorn, supra note 26.
31. Foon Rhee, Liddy: Some “Distasteful” Bonuses Will Be Returned, BOSTON.COM (Mar. 18,
2009), http://www.boston.com/news/politics/politicalintelligence/2009/03/frank_not_optim.html.
32. Id.
33. Letter from Gerald W. McEntee, President, AFSCME, Denise L. Nappier, Treasurer, State
of Conn. & Richard L. Trumka, Sec’y Treasurer, AFL-CIO, to Jill M. Considine, Chester B.
Feldberg & Douglas L. Foshee, Majority S’holders, AIG (Mar. 31, 2009), available at
http://www.afscme.org/docs/AIG_Trustee_Letter_3.31_re_Vote_No.pdf.
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the economy but later realized that banks were reluctant to lend for fear of
continued economic deterioration. As a result, bailout recipients faced
mounting pressure from the President and Congress to increase lending.
President Obama said he would “hold banks ‘fully accountable’ for the assistance they receive, and that they ‘will have to clearly demonstrate how
taxpayer dollars result in more lending for the American taxpayer.’”34
Senators lashed out at banking executives appearing before the Senate
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee for using bailout funds for
anything other than increasing lending.35 At a separate hearing before the
House Financial Services Committee, Representative Judy Biggert questioned whether “the funds [had] been used to get credit flowing again, not
just to financial institutions but to consumers and small businesses.”36 Other
committee members “sought promises from the bank executives that they
would use the government funds they received to make loans and stimulate
the economy, rather than hold onto it to bolster their balance sheets.”
Representative Michael Capuano implored executives to “get our money out
on the street.”37
Similar calls from Congress soon followed for banks to stem
foreclosures and restrain action against struggling homeowners. Barney
Frank “acknowledged that struggling homeowners [were not] getting help as
fast as many in Congress had hoped”38 and urged bank executives to put in
place a foreclosure moratorium until the government could implement mitigation programs.39 Frank also criticized hedge fund managers for reportedly
directing mortgage servicers to disregard any government program that undercut investment value.40 Senator Charles Schumer told regulators that
“they seemed to be giving the banks ‘a little too much dessert and not
making them eat their vegetables,’” because banks had not been required to
assist homeowners despite receiving bailout funds.41 In response, many big

34. Christi Parsons & Peter Nicholas, “We Will Rebuild, We Will Recover,” L.A. TIMES, Feb.
25, 2009, at A1.
35. Ross Kerber, Banks Draw Heavy Fire from Capitol Hill, BOS. GLOBE, Nov. 14, 2008,
http://www.boston.com/business/articles/2008/11/14/banks_draw_heavy_fire_from_capitol_hill.
36. Maura Reynolds & Jim Puzzanghera, Financial Giants’ CEOs, Geithner on Hot Seats, CHI.
TRIB., Feb. 12, 2009, at 27.
37. Ross Kerber, Businesses in N.E. Say Lenders Too Strict, BOS. GLOBE, Feb. 21, 2009, at A1.
38. Ross Kerber, Frank Talks About the Economy, BOS. GLOBE, Oct. 25, 2008,
http://www.boston.com/business/articles/2008/10/25/frank_talk_about_the_economy/.
39. Maura Reynolds & Jim Puzzanghera, Economic Crisis: Lawmakers Give Banks a Scolding,
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2009, at C5.
40. Kerber, supra note 38.
41. David Stout & Brian Knowlton, Senators Press for Action to Stem Foreclosures, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 24, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/24/business/economy/24cong.html?
pagewanted=print.
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banks put into operation temporary foreclosure moratoriums in advance of
the Obama Administration’s housing-rescue-plan announcement.42
One adaptation to this intense scrutiny has been to preclear any
potentially controversial decision with the Treasury or the White House. It
was reported, for example, that in the wake of the firestorm of criticism of
the AIG bonuses, “senior Treasury officials have been meeting several times
a week all spring to review, one by one, the payments to the company’s
executives. But the time-consuming discussions have never resolved
whether any of the executives should get paid.”43 This led to preclearance of
even routine bonuses by Kenneth Feinberg, the “compensation czar.”44
The Treasury ousted Rick Wagoner as GM’s CEO on March 29, 2009.
He remained an employee of GM until July 14 because it took that long for
the Treasury to decide whether he should receive the severance package that
the company had promised him.45
The GM and Chrysler bailouts have brought an avalanche of political
attention. The Senate has held hearings on GM’s and Chrysler’s plans to reduce their networks of dealerships. As the Washington Post summarized,
“Empowered by the government’s emerging ownership role, members of a
Senate committee yesterday excoriated General Motors and Chrysler for their
decisions last month to close more than 2,000 dealers.”46 Senator Mark
Warner, although acknowledging the dangers of trying to micromanage
government-owned companies, nonetheless said that “we’ve got the right and
responsibility to ask these questions.”47 GM and Chrysler also have facilities
in many different congressional districts. As the Washington Post reported,
“Rep. Barney Frank (D-Mass.) said GM management had agreed to postpone
a planned shutdown of a parts distribution center in Norton, Mass., after a
meeting he had with its chief executive, Fritz Henderson.”48 The political

42. Maura Reynolds & E. Scott Reckard, Obama Speeds Rescue Plan, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 14,
2009, at C1.
43. David Cho, At Geithner’s Treasury, Key Decisions on Hold, WASH. POST, May 18, 2009,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/17/AR2009051702268.html.
44. Brady Dennis, AIG Plans Millions More in Bonuses, WASH. POST, July 11, 2009,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/11/AR2009071100419.html; see
also Liam Pleven & Deborah Solomon, AIG Seeks Clearance to Release Bonuses, WALL ST. J., July
10, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124718910241620823.html.
45. Cho, supra note 43; see also Bloomberg News, Ex-GM Chief to Get $8.5 Million in
Retirement Pay, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/15/business/
15auto.html.
46. Peter Whoriskey & Kendra Marr, Senators Blast Automakers over Dealer Closings: GM,
Chrysler Defend Massive Shutdowns, WASH. POST, June 4, 2009, at A15.
47. Id.
48. Anthony Faiola, Test-Driving a Foreign Business Model, WASH. POST, June 22, 2009,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/21/AR2009062101966_pf.html.
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involvement continues to intensify.49 Indeed, in May 2010, GM announced
plans to reinstate half of the dealers who challenged GM’s terminations.50
But it is worth keeping in mind that the government can give as well as
take. In a little-noticed ruling at the time of the GM Section 363 sale, the
IRS decided, contrary to general practice, that old GM’s “net operating loss”
tax-carry-forwards would pass to new GM.51 The effect of this ruling is that
the first $45.4 billion of new GM’s profits will be tax free.
More recently, the political dance has become even more complex.
After a pause during its expedited bankruptcy, government-controlled GM
has resumed its lobbying and campaign contributions. Federal Election
Commission records indicate that GM contributed $90,500 to lawmakers
during the current election cycle.52 It has also rebuilt its lobbying force,
spending $6.9 million in the year following its exit from bankruptcy.53
At Citigroup, the ongoing instability in the top management has been
attributed to conflicts with federal regulators:
Mr. Pandit made the changes under pressure from federal regulators
and after discussions with Citigroup Chairman Richard Parsons, who
has been trying to defuse a standoff between the company and some
top federal officials, people familiar with the situation say. The
federal government will soon own as much as 34% of Citigroup’s
shares.54
More recently, Citigroup sold its profitable PhiBro subsidiary at a
bargain price to avoid a conflict with the Treasury over $100 million in
compensation owed to Andrew Sullivan.55
The Treasury’s political considerations have led it to block profitable
actions by controlled firms. For example, at Fannie Mae, the Treasury vetoed a sale of $3 billion in tax credits to Goldman Sachs and Berkshire
Hathaway. Although these tax credits were worthless to Fannie Mae, the
49. Id.
50. Nick Bunkley, G.M. Plans to Reinstate 661 Dealerships, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/06/business/06dealers.html.
51. Randall Smith & Sharon Terlep, GM Could Be Free of Taxes for Years, WALL ST. J., Nov.
3, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704462704575590642149103202.html;
see also Ted Reed, What About GM’s Tax Losses?, THE STREET (June 9, 2010),
http://www.thestreet.com/story/10510986/what-about-gms-tax-losses.html (quoting a senior
administration official as stating that the net operating loss “would be transferred to the new
company”).
52. Josh Mitchell, GM Resumes Political Giving, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704129204575506352139305206.html.
53. Silla Brush, GM Rebuilds D.C. Lobbying Force as It Enters Post-bailout Era, THE HILL
(Sept. 21, 2010), http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/119885-gm-rebuilds-its-lobbying-force-forpost-bailout-era.
54. David Enrich & Robin Sidel, Citigroup Shakes Up Leaders to Pacify U.S., WALL ST. J.,
July 10, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124714471454017995.html.
55. Eric Dash & Jack Healy, Citi Averts Clash over Huge Bonus, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/10/business/10citi.html.
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Treasury would have lost tax revenues had they been sold to an entity that
could use the credits to offset its taxes. In this way, the financial interests of
the Treasury and of Fannie Mae and its (nongovernmental) shareholders and
creditors were in clear conflict—and the Treasury’s interests prevailed.56
These anecdotes raise a variety of concerns, two of which we will focus
57
on. First, one worries that the influence or control that comes with a major
investment (debt or equity) will be used to achieve goals other than maximizing the value of the firm or ensuring that the debt is repaid. With the
polycentric power structure of the federal government, the potential exists for
congressional pressure to be brought to bear on firms to adopt policies favored by politicians without regard to whether those policies advance the
interests of the firm. The automobile-dealership hearings provide a concrete
example: the political pressure could surely convince GM and Chrysler to
preserve some politically well-connected dealerships that they otherwise
would close.
The second concern is that the resulting governance structure will be
dysfunctional. This may be caused by managers’ attempts to be responsive
to too many different sources of pressure. With pressures from chairs of
congressional committees, the White House, and the Treasury, steering the
ship forward becomes even more complicated. Additionally, as noted above,
to the extent that, for example, the Treasury expects to sign off on significant
business decisions and does not have the staff or expertise in place to provide
this input in a timely or competent manner, the quality of the decisions may
be compromised.
We close this subpart with GM’s straightforward articulation of the
potential conflicts of interest:
The UST (or its designee) will continue to own a substantial interest in
us following this offering, and its interests may differ from those of our
other stockholders.
Immediately following this offering, the UST will own
approximately 36.9% of our outstanding shares of common stock
(33.3% if the underwriters in the offering of common stock exercise
their over-allotment option in full). As a result of this stock ownership

56. Nick Timiraos, Treasury Blocks the Sale of Tax Credits by Fannie, WALL ST. J., Nov. 7,
2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125754828200334693.html.
57. Government ownership in the United Kingdom has had very similar effects. See, e.g., Dana
Cimilluca & Sara Schaefer Munoz, RBS Draws Fire in U.K. over Its Role in Kraft Deal, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 17, 2009, at C1 (describing Parliament members’ objections to government-controlled
Royal Bank of Scotland’s lending and advisory relationship with Kraft in Kraft’s hostile bid for
Cadbury); Robert Lindsay & Miles Costello, RBS Board Keeps Resignation Threat over Bonuses
Alive, TIMES ONLINE, Dec. 15, 2009, http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_
sectors/banking_and_finance/article6957239.ece (describing Royal Bank of Scotland directors’
threats to resign if the government took action to reduce the size of the bank’s employee bonus
pool).
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interest, the UST has the ability to exert control, through its power to
vote for the election of our directors, over various matters. To the
extent the UST elects to exert such control over us, its interests (as a
government entity) may differ from those of our other stockholders and
it may influence, through its ability to vote for the election of our
directors, matters including:
• The selection, tenure and compensation of our management;
• Our business strategy and product offerings;
• Our relationship with our employees, unions and other
constituencies; and
• Our financing activities, including the issuance of debt and equity
securities.
In particular, the UST may have a greater interest in promoting U.S.
economic growth and jobs than other stockholders of the Company. For
example, while we have repaid in full our indebtedness under the UST
Credit Agreement, a covenant that continues to apply until the earlier of
December 31, 2014 or the UST has been paid in full the total amount of
all UST invested capital requires that we use our commercially
reasonable best efforts to ensure, subject to exceptions, that our
manufacturing volume in the United States is consistent with specified
benchmarks.
In the future we may also become subject to new and additional laws
and government regulations regarding various aspects of our business as
a result of participation in the TARP program and the U.S.
government’s ownership in our business. These regulations could make
it more difficult for us to compete with other companies that are not
subject to similar regulations.58
C. How Did We Get Here?
Government ownership, a product of a fast-moving and fast-changing
crisis, is widespread and extremely complicated. Money has been invested
through a variety of programs with a variety of restrictions and a variety of
goals. As a result, the terms of the government’s ownership positions vary
widely among portfolio companies. To describe the broad patterns of
ownership, we briefly review the chronology and the relevant legislation.
Beginning in the summer of 2007, troubles in the subprime-mortgage
sector undermined confidence not just in the asset-backed securities that
contained those mortgages but more generally in the credibility of fundamental legal and market structures: the accuracy of the credit ratings, the
solvency of the monoline insurers, and the safety and soundness of key fi-

58. GEN. MOTORS CO., PROSPECTUS 27 (2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/
edgar/data/1467858/000119312510263635/d424b11.pdf.
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nancial institutions. As confidence in market institutions collapsed, and with
it confidence in the soundness of counterparties, the credit markets froze.
In response, the Treasury and the Federal Reserve intervened in a
variety of ways. In the first stage of intervention, they sought to unfreeze the
credit markets by providing additional liquidity. In August 2007, the Federal
Reserve, along with the European Central Bank, injected $100 billion for
borrowing;59 in November 2007, it injected another $41 billion;60 in the
Spring of 2008, it cut interest rates61 and opened the discount window to investment banks.62
Second, the Treasury and the Federal Reserve intervened in an ad hoc
way to try to prevent failures of systemically important financial institutions.
Thus, in March 2008, the Federal Reserve provided financial assistance to
J.P. Morgan Chase in the rescue of Bear Stearns.63 Also during March, the
Federal Reserve announced measures to provide liquidity to commercial and
investment banks. Later, during the summer of 2008, the Treasury acted to
shore up the capital structures of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and ultimately
put both into conservatorship.64
These interventions were controversial.
Some argued that the
government had no business intervening to save firms and that doing so
created moral hazard.65 Others argued that the interventions were indefensible handouts to the rich and powerful.66
Then came the failure of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008, and
the ensuing panic.

59. See Scott Lanman & Christian Vits, Central Banks Add Cash to Avert Crisis of Confidence,
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 10, 2007), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=ah7K.
eFz9xiU&refer=home (describing emergency measures performed in tandem by central banks to
avert a global crisis).
60. Michael M. Grynbaum, In Wild Swing, Stocks Give Up Rate-Cut Gains, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 2, 2007, at A1.
61. Steven R. Weisman, Fed Cuts Rate but Hints About a Pause, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2008, at
C1.
62. Michael J. de la Merced, Fed Extends Emergency Borrowing Program, N.Y. TIMES,
July 31, 2008, at C12.
63. See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, How to Prevent Hard Cases from Making Bad Law:
Bear Stearns, Delaware, and the Strategic Use of Comity, 58 EMORY L.J. 713, 717 (2009)
(describing the Fed’s involvement in the Bear Stearns collapse).
64. Stephen Labaton & Edmund L. Andrews, In Rescue to Stabilize Lending, U.S. Takes Over
Mortgage Finance Giants, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2008, at A1.
65. See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, Op-Ed., Rescue Me: A Fed Bailout Crosses a Line, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 16, 2008, Sunday Business, at 1 (criticizing the Federal Reserve’s bailout of Bear
Stearns, especially because the bank “operated in the gray area of Wall Street and with an
aggressive, brass-knuckles approach”).
66. See, e.g., Nouriel Roubini, Public Losses for Private Gain, GUARDIAN.CO.UK (Sept. 18,
2008), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/sep/18/marketturmoil.creditcrunch (calling
the bailouts “the biggest government intervention and nationalizations in the recent history of
humanity, all for the benefit of the rich and the well connected”).
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On September 16, 2008, the Federal Reserve saved AIG by pledging
$85 billion in exchange, inter alia, for a promise to issue preferred stock with
79.9% of the voting rights.67 Subsequent amounts were ultimately pledged
and invested in AIG.
On October 3, 2008, on its second try, Congress enacted the Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act of 200868 (EESA), which gave birth to the TARP
program. This set the framework for most of the subsequent investments in
firms. Within the TARP framework, a variety of programs were launched
including the Capital Purchase Program (CPP), used to invest in banks; the
Systemically Significant Failing Institutions Program (SSFIP), used for subsequent investments in AIG; the Targeted Investment Program (TIP), used
for Citigroup and Bank of America; and the Term Asset-Backed Lending
Facility (TALF).
To understand the terms of the government’s portfolio, we need to
review briefly the key provisions of the EESA. In doing so, it is critical to
keep in mind that when enacted, the stated rationale was that TARP funds
would be used to purchase toxic assets from troubled financial institutions.
But TARP later morphed into a program to invest directly in troubled financial institutions, a direction that was already contemplated even before the
EESA was enacted but not disclosed to Congress.69 It is also critical to recall
how difficult it was to pass the EESA and the political obstacles to returning
to Congress for additional authority or funding.
With this as background, we turn to the statutory structure. In keeping
with the original conception, the EESA authorized the Treasury to buy
“troubled assets” from “financial institutions.”70 The Treasury was given
additional discretion through the broad definition of troubled assets, which
potentially included any mortgage or related security as well as any other
financial instrument so designated by the Treasury Secretary.71 Finally, in
order to allow taxpayers to benefit from the upside of these purchases,
§ 113(d) required that when the Treasury purchased troubled assets from a
67. It was subsequently reduced to 77.9%, with an additional 2% in connection with a warrant.
68. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat.
3765.
69. ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL 508–16 (2009).
70. EESA § 101(a), 122 Stat. at 3767 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5211(a)).
71. The EESA also provides,
The term “troubled assets” means—(A) residential or commercial mortgages and any
securities, obligations, or other instruments that are based on or related to such
mortgages, that in each case was originated or issued on or before March 14, 2008, the
purchase of which the Secretary determines promotes financial market stability; and
(B) any other financial instrument that the Secretary, after consultation with the
Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, determines the
purchase of which is necessary to promote financial market stability, but only upon
transmittal of such determination, in writing, to the appropriate committees of
Congress.
Id. § 3(9), 122 Stat. at 3767 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5202).
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financial institution, the Treasury must also receive a warrant.72 Under the
terms of § 113(d), the warrant must be for nonvoting shares or, if no
nonvoting shares are provided for in the certificate of incorporation, the
Treasury must agree not to vote the warrant shares.
As noted above, the bailout strategy shifted decisively away from the
purchase of troubled assets to investment in troubled firms. Because the definition of troubled asset noted above is very broad73 and the prohibition on
acquiring voting stock only applied to warrant shares and not to the troubled
assets themselves,74 the Treasury had clear authority to buy voting common
stock in financial institutions.
This authority was exercised in various ways. In the CPP, which
channeled funds to banks, the Treasury chose to acquire nonvoting preferred
stock. The Treasury’s standard term sheet, developed by private equity lawyers at Simpson Thacher,75 provided that the senior preferred stock would be
nonvoting except for class voting rights on the issuance of more senior
securities, on changes to the rights of the senior preferred stock, or on any
merger or other transaction that would adversely affect the rights of the senior preferred stock.76 As described above, in TARP investments pursuant to
other programs, the Treasury has sometimes taken voting stock.77 Finally,
there are situations in which the Treasury has switched from nonvoting to
voting stock.78 This has led to a somewhat varied set of terms within the
government’s portfolio.

72. In the case of publicly held firms, § 113(d)(1)(A) provides,
The Secretary may not purchase, or make any commitment to purchase, any troubled
asset under the authority of this Act, unless the Secretary receives from the financial
institution from which such assets are to be purchased—
(A) in the case of a financial institution, the securities of which are traded on a
national securities exchange, a warrant giving the right to the Secretary to
receive nonvoting common stock or preferred stock in such financial institution,
or voting stock with respect to which, the Secretary agrees not to exercise voting
power, as the Secretary determines appropriate.”
Id. § 113(d)(1)(A), 122 Stat. at 3778 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5223). Similar provisions apply
to privately held firms. Id. § 113(d)(1)(B).
73. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
74. EESA § 113(d), 122 Stat. at 3778.
75. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Hires Legal Adviser Under the
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (Oct. 16, 2008), available at http://www.treasury.gov/presscenter/press-releases/Pages/hp1217.aspx.
76. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, TARP Capital Purchase Program: Summary of Preferred Terms
4, available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/term%20sheet%20
%20private%20c%20corporations.pdf; see also U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Securities Purchase
Agreement: Standard Terms § 4.6, at 30, available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financialstability/investment-programs/cpp/Documents/spa.pdf (referring to the Treasury’s commitment not
to vote warrant shares).
77. See supra section II(A)(1).
78. See infra text accompanying notes 87–93.
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The government then used TARP to bail out the automobile industry.
In December 2008, pursuant to the CPP, the Treasury invested $5 billion in
GMAC (which had become a bank holding company in order to qualify for
the CPP) in exchange for preferred stock and warrants that did not carry
voting rights.79 The Treasury subsequently created the Automotive Industry
Financing Program (AIFP). In May 2009, through the AIFP, the Treasury
invested an additional $7.5 billion in GMAC.80 As of June 2009, the
Treasury held 35% of GMAC’s equity with the ability to increase that stake
to more than 50% through the exercise of warrants.81 At the end of 2009, the
Treasury invested an additional $3.8 billion, increasing its total investment to
$16.3 billion and increasing its stock ownership to 56%.82
As GMAC became a bank holding company before receiving any TARP
funds, the investments fit comfortably within the statutory authority. The use
of TARP funds under the AIFP to invest in GM and Chrysler sits on a less
secure statutory foundation. Although, as noted above, the statutory definition of troubled asset is sufficiently broad to include common or preferred
stock, the statutory definition of “financial institution” is more problematic.
In order to have authority to receive TARP funds, it must be the case that
GM and Chrysler are, under the statute, financial institutions. The EESA’s
definition of a financial institution provides in relevant part,
The term “financial institution” means any institution, including, but
not limited to, any bank, savings association, credit union, security
broker or dealer, or insurance company, established and regulated
under the laws of the United States or any State . . . and having
significant operations in the United States, but excluding any central
bank of, or institution owned by, a foreign government.83
For GM and Chrysler to fit this definition, one must read the phrase
“any institution, including, but not limited to” to sweep in institutions that are
not financial institutions under any normal understanding of the term. As a
matter of statutory interpretation, that argument hardly passes the smell test.
As a matter of politics, the Treasury had little choice: Congress had already

79. Edmund L. Andres & Bill Vlasic, U.S. Agrees to a Stake in GMAC, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30,
2008, at B1.
80. Glenn Somerville, New Multi-Million Bailout Coming for GMAC: Report, REUTERS (May
21, 2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE54K6DL20090521.
81. See Jordan Fabian, U.S. to Take Majority Stake in GMAC, THE HILL (Dec. 30, 2009),
http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/73969-federal-government-to-take-majoritystake-in-gmac (describing the Treasury’s increase in ownership stake in GMAC from 35% to 56%).
82. Nick Bunkley, Treasury to Give 3.8 Billion More to GMAC in a Third Taxpayer Bailout,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/31/business/31gmac.html?_r=
2&emc=eta1.
83. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 3(5), 122
Stat. 3765, 3766–67 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5202(5)).
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rejected a request to authorize funds to bail out the auto industry84 and had
only passed the EESA on its second try. But however thin the basis under
the EESA, it did not help the secured bondholders who objected in the
Chrysler bankruptcy; they found out that they did not have standing to make
the argument.85
Through its TARP investments, the Treasury currently has an 8% voting
stake in new Chrysler86 and a 26% voting stake in new GM.87
In this fluid situation, the size and nature of the government’s interest
can change. In the fourth quarter of 2008, the Treasury invested $45 billion
in Citigroup in exchange for nonvoting perpetual preferred stock and
warrants convertible into 6.2% of Citigroup’s voting stock.88 The exercise
price of the warrants is well above current stock price, and none have so far
been exercised.89 On February 27, 2009, in order to increase its “core” Tier 1
capital, Citigroup announced plans for an exchange offer to exchange
preferred stock for common stock. As part of this exchange offer, the
Treasury agreed to exchange up to $25 billion of its preferred stock for
common stock on a dollar-for-dollar basis with other holders of preferred
stock.90 After the completion of the exchange offer, the Treasury owned approximately 34% of Citigroup’s outstanding common stock, not including
the exercise of warrants issued as part of the TARP investment.91 This, of
course, can change: Citigroup recently raised $17 billion in new common
equity while the Treasury was unsuccessful in selling its stake, leaving the
Treasury’s stake, after the dilution from the new stock issuance, at 26%.92 In

84. David M. Herszenhorn & David E. Sanger, Senate Abandons Automaker Bailout Bid, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 12, 2008, at A1.
85. See In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. 79, 83 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“[T]he Court finds that
the Indiana Funds do not have standing under EESA to challenge the actions of the U.S. Treasury
pursuant to TARP.”).
86. Amended and Restated Limited Liability Company Operating Agreement of Chrysler
Group LLC (June 10, 2009) (Schedule of Members), available at http://www.treasury.
gov/initiatives/financial-stability/investment-programs/aifp/Documents_Contracts_Agreements/
Chrysler%20LLC%20Corporate%20as%20of%2012-01-10.pdf; see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t
of the Treasury, supra note 18 (referencing the Treasury’s plan to receive 8% of the equity of
Chrysler).
87. Merced & Vlasic, supra note 20.
88. Citigroup, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 6, 9, 44 (Feb. 22, 2008) [hereinafter Annual
Report]; see also Citigroup, Inc., Proxy Statement 1, 19 (Mar. 20, 2009) [hereinafter Proxy
Statement].
89. Proxy Statement, supra note 88, at 1.
90. Citigroup, Inc., Exchange Offer (Form S-4), at 37 amend. 4 (June 18, 2009); see also
Annual Report, supra note 88, at 45.
91. Citigroup, Inc., supra note 14, at 9.
92. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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further sales during 2010, the Treasury disposed of the remainder of its
stake.93
D. Purpose Versus Effect of Acquiring Stock Position
So, through a variety of routes, the Treasury has ended up with equity
investments in private firms. These range from relatively small nonvoting
positions to controlling stakes.
There is no evidence that the government took these positions in order
to gain control. First, as noted above, the original expectation was that the
Treasury would be acquiring troubled assets, not equity stakes. The language
of the EESA, as well as its legislative history, make clear that the Treasury
took warrants in order to be able to profit from any increases in share value.
The cleanest and easiest way for the taxpayers to share in the upside of these
investments, without exercising control, was through warrants for nonvoting
stock.
Moreover, as the sole available lender and as the regulator of many of
these entities, the government already had significant power. In the short
term, voting rights may not have added much. As the largest, and probably
only, willing lender and with the normal covenants (no dividends, veto over
acts or transactions that could impair the value of the nonvoting preferred
stock, etc.), the Treasury already had significant control.
But, although only the looniest bloggers would claim that this was all a
plot to foist socialism on America,94 the result of these various initiatives has
been, as noted above, that the Treasury now has significant ownership stakes
in a variety of firms. And with control comes the temptation and opportunity
to interfere. As the earlier illustrations show, once the Treasury owns large
or controlling equity stakes in firms, there is a temptation to use those stakes
as instruments of control. If Barney Frank can prevent GM from closing a
parts distribution facility in his district, he will save the jobs of his
constituents, and this may be worthwhile even if it interferes with GM’s
plans to trim costs. While the incentive to interfere is obvious, the structure
of this temptation has several features.
First, an equity position, especially a control block, can provide the
power to interfere. Indeed, because there are so many different means by
which a controlling shareholder can exercise control, it rarely must do so.
Usually, it is enough for the control shareholder simply to indicate its

93. Randall Smith, Aaron Lucchetti & Michael R. Crittenden, U.S. Unloads Citi Stake for a $12
Billion Profit, WALL ST. J., Dec. 7, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487041563
04576003884177348202.html.
94. See, e.g., Georg Thomas, GM Symbol of USA: Obama’s Vulture Socialism,
REDSTATEECLECTIC (June 4, 2009), http://redstateeclectic.typepad.com/redstate_commentary/
2009/06/gm-symbol-of-usa-obamas-vulture-socialism.html (“Obama is the figurehead of the
accelerating takeover of the United States by vulture socialists.”).
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preference and the managers will acquiesce. Real power need never be
overtly exercised. Although it may be that the federal government has sufficient regulatory power to intervene across the full range of issues, a control
block provides a different kind of power: a power that, depending on how it
is structured, can be exercised more informally and with more discretion,
outside of the formal regulatory process and the accompanying public
scrutiny, and more directly by politicians rather than by appointed
bureaucrats.
Second, stock ownership provides periodic opportunities to interfere.
Every year, shareholders elect directors and vote on shareholder proposals,
compensation plans, auditors, etc. A controlling shareholder’s vote will typically be decisive.95 As a result, once one has control, one has virtually no
choice but to decide critical issues. At AIG, where a trust holds the
Treasury’s 77.9% stake, the AIG trustees simply cannot avoid deciding who
will be the directors. If they do not attend the meeting, in person or by
proxy, no actions can be taken for lack of a quorum. If they do attend, their
vote is decisive. When AFSCME submits a shareholder proposal at AIG, the
AIG trustees’ decision on how to vote the Treasury’s shares will determine
whether the proposal is approved or rejected.
Finally, an existing stock position minimizes the political cost of
interference. To be sure, in times of crisis—like the last three years—the
government as regulator and lender of last resort has ample power over companies to have its way without any stock ownership at all. The Obama
Administration could get rid of GM CEO Rick Wagoner by a mere
suggestion, even without any stock ownership. The White House and the
Treasury surely had the power to force Bank of America’s CEO Ken Lewis
to step down, even without stock ownership.96 But this power dissipates
quickly. In ordinary times, firms will have allegiances with congressional
forces, and the political cost of executive interference with internal firm decisions will be high. When, for example, in the wake of Enron and accounting
scandals, a Republican administration sought to rein in Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, their strong Congressional support protected them from
interference. The power and periodic opportunities provided by stock
ownership will change the cost of interference during ordinary times, even if
it will not eliminate those costs.
95. Unless one has precommitted to mirror voting, as for example, the Treasury did at Citigroup
over certain matters. See infra note 259 and accompanying text.
96. See Bank of America and Merrill Lynch: How Did a Private Deal Turn Into a Federal
Bailout? Part III: Joint Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform and the
Subcomm. on Domestic Policy of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 111th Cong. 24–25
(2009) (statement of Henry M. Paulson, Secretary of the Treasury) (detailing the process by which
Bank of America’s management could be removed and acknowledging that Paulson threatened
removal); Dan Fitzpatrick, U.S. Regulators to B of A: Obey or Else, WALL ST. J., July 16, 2009,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124771415436449393.html#mod=testMod (discussing the influence
that the government exerted upon Bank of America).
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III. When the Government Is the Controlling Shareholder: Regulation
A. The Baseline:
Shareholders

The

Problems

Posed

by

Ordinary

Controlling

Delaware corporate law has long been suspicious of controlling
shareholders. Under Delaware law, a shareholder is “controlling” if either
the shareholder controls a majority of the votes in a corporation or if the
shareholder controls less than a majority but there is evidence that the
shareholder exercises control over the board (if, for example, the directors
defer to the views of the shareholder).97
If a shareholder is viewed as controlling, there are two consequences.
First, that shareholder is deemed to owe fiduciary duties to the remaining
“minority” or “noncontrolling” shareholders.98 These duties extend to the
shareholder’s action in influencing board or management decisions99 but not
to its actions in voting its shares.100
Second, special rules apply to the legal standard for alleged breaches of
fiduciary duties—at least some breaches. Transactions that do not enjoy the
protection of the business-judgment rule—because they entail self-dealing,
involve other material conflicts of interest, or were arrived at in a grossly
negligent matter—are evaluated under the entire-fairness standard with the
burden of proving entire fairness on the defendant directors (or the defendant
controlling shareholder).101 But generally, if, after full disclosure, these
transactions are approved by a majority of disinterested and independent
directors or disinterested shareholders, the business-judgment rule is

97. RODMAN WARD, JR. ET AL., FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW
§ 151.5.1 (5th ed. 2006) (citing In re Tri-Star Pictures, Inc., 634 A.2d 319, 328 (Del. 1993), and
Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1344 (Del. 1987)); see also Emerald
Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 94 (Del. 2001) (“‘[A] shareholder who owns less than 50% of a
corporation’s outstanding stock, without some additional allegation of domination through actual
control of corporat[e] conduct, is not a “controlling stockholder.”’” (quoting Emerald Partners v.
Berlin, 726 A.2d 1215, 1221 n.8 (Del. 1999))); Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110,
1114 (Del. 1994) (holding that Alcatel was a controlling shareholder because it held a 43.3% stake
in Lynch and controlled Lynch’s business affairs); In re Cysive, Inc. S’holders Litig., 836 A.2d 531,
551–53 (Del. Ch. 2003) (holding that Cysive’s CEO, though a minority shareholder, was
nevertheless the controlling shareholder because he was the founder, CEO, had family members in
executive positions, and controlled enough shares to cast the decisive vote in any contested matter).
98. WARD ET AL., supra note 97, at § 151.5.1.
99. Ivanhoe Partners, 535 A.2d at 1344.
100. See HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 240, at 653 (3d
ed. 1983) (clarifying that shareholders can vote as they desire because their shares are their private
property).
101. For a discussion of the shifting burden of persuasion under the entire-fairness standard, see
Bud Roth, Entire Fairness Review for a “Pure” Breach of the Duty of Care: Sensible Approach or
Technicolor Flop?, 15 DEL. L. REV. 145, 165–67 (2000). See also Cathy L. Reese & Kelly A.
Herring, Recent Developments in Delaware Corporate Law, 7 DEL. L. REV. 177, 192, 197 (2004)
(summarizing cases where the entire-fairness burden was at issue).
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reinstated, and the transaction must pass only the (lenient) standard of
waste.102 Such approvals are also referred to as “cleansing acts.”103
However, if the transaction involves a controlling shareholder, the rules
on cleansing acts are different. First, as to approval by disinterested
directors, the court mandates stricter conduct before their approval “counts.”
In particular, it is not sufficient that these directors are technically
disinterested and independent; they must also devote substantial care to
evaluating the transaction, must have the power to say no, and must employ
appropriate processes (including, when warranted, the hiring of independent
legal and business advisors). Second, as to the effect of the cleansing act (if
the approval counts), it does not reinstate the business-judgment rule but
merely shifts the burden of proving entire fairness to the plaintiffs (who have
to prove that the transaction was not entirely fair).104
The reason for the skepticism about approval by independent directors
is reasonably clear. After all, a majority shareholder controls the board composition and thus effectively appoints the directors and can remove them at
any time, and the directors know it. Even nonmajority controlling shareholders have substantial influence over board composition. Directors have
sometimes shown excessive deference to controlling shareholders, leading to
some skepticism on just how independent the directors can or will be.105 In
the Delaware case law, controlling shareholders have been likened to “800pound gorilla[s]” who are so intimidating that they always get their way.106

102. WARD ET AL., supra note 97, § 151.5.4 (citing Harris v. Carter, 582 A.2d 222, 235–36
(Del. Ch. 1990)).
103. See David B. Feirstein, Note, Parents and Subsidiaries in Delaware: A Dysfunctional
Standard, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 479, 488 (2006) (citing Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701,
703 (Del. 1983)) (“[T]he court noted that an informed vote of a majority of disinterested
shareholders (a ‘Cleansing Act’) could serve to shift this burden of proving entire fairness (or the
lack thereof) to the plaintiff . . . .”).
104. See, e.g., Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1117 (Del. 1994) (holding
that approval by disinterested directors shifts the burden of proof to the plaintiff but does not change
the entire-fairness standard). There is some ambiguity in the Delaware case law. Compare Kahn v.
Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422, 428 (Del. 1997) (stating, in the context of a self-dealing transaction
involving the controlling shareholder, that approval by a properly functioning committee of
independent directors would shift the burden of the entire-fairness standard to plaintiffs), with
Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 20 n.36 (Del. Ch. 2002) (stating, in the context of a merger
involving a material conflict of interest on the part of the controlling shareholder, that entire fairness
applies ab initio to “a squeeze out merger or a merger between two companies under the control of a
controlling shareholder”). Orman v. Cullman thus raises the possibility that entire fairness does not
apply to all transactions involving controlling shareholders but only to a subset.
105. See, e.g., In re Emerging Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. Civ.A. 16415, 2004 WL
1305745, at *33–35 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2004) (describing shareholders’ contentions that the board
was unfairly beholden to the controlling shareholder in approving an unfair privatization).
106. See In re Pure Res., Inc. S’holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 436 (Del. Ch. 2002). In the words
of one court,
The Supreme Court [in Kahn v. Lynch Communication Systems, Inc.] concluded that
even a gauntlet of protective barriers like those would be insufficient protection
because of (what I will term) the “inherent coercion” that exists when a controlling
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As to the approval by disinterested shareholders, the stated reason for
the skepticism is that shareholders may be afraid of retaliation by the controlling shareholder if they fail to grant their approval. A second, unstated
reason is that shareholders, without the benefit of the advice of trusted independent directors and subject to shareholders’ own collective-action
problems, may make too many mistakes in their approval to justify restoring
business-judgment review.
B. The Problem of the Government as a Controlling Shareholder
Whatever the poundage of a regular, private controlling shareholder, the
problems created—and the weight of the corresponding gorilla—are
potentially magnified when the controlling shareholder is the U.S.
government. First, for many of the companies in which the U.S. government
has obtained a controlling stake, the influence of the government extends
beyond its influence as a large shareholder. For banks and other financial
companies, the government also acts as the principal regulator.107 In companies such as AIG, GMAC, and Citigroup, the government also has a
significant stake as a creditor and may be the sole source of additional
capital. And for any company, regardless of industry, the potential exists that
the government will pass new types of regulation. This potential is not farfetched. Companies that were recipients of federal TARP funds—several of
which were pushed by the government to take these funds—found themselves subject to a new law, not applicable to other companies, that forced
them to either limit the amount of executive compensation or submit their
compensation to an advisory shareholder vote. Because the government
holds so many levers—as large shareholders, as present and potential future
regulator, and sometimes as lender and creditor—it is potentially a much
bigger gorilla than a regular, private controlling shareholder.
Second, conflicts between the controlling shareholder and the minority
shareholders are much harder to monitor when the controlling shareholder is

stockholder announces its desire to buy the minority’s shares. In colloquial terms, the
Supreme Court saw the controlling stockholder as the 800-pound gorilla whose urgent
hunger for the rest of the bananas is likely to frighten less powerful primates like
putatively independent directors who might well have been hand-picked by the gorilla
(and who at the very least owed their seats on the board to his support).
Id.
107. On the influence this can give, see, for example, SORKIN, supra note 69, at 524–25. In a
meeting with major bank CEOs, Treasury Secretary Paulson insisted that the banks accept TARP
money, whether they wanted it or not. When Richard Kovacevich, CEO of Wells Fargo, resisted,
Sorkin reports,
Paulson told him, “Your regulator is sitting right there.” John Dugan, comptroller of
the currency, and FDIC chairwoman Sheila Bair were directly across the table from
him. “And you’re going to get a call tomorrow telling you you’re undercapitalized and
that you won’t be able to raise money in the private markets.”
Id. at 525.
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the government. For regular, private controlling shareholders, the conflicts
of interests are predominantly financial. Such conflicts arise in so-called
self-dealing transactions—where the controlled entity deals either directly
with the controlling shareholders or with another entity in which the controlling shareholder has an interest—or in conflicts transactions—where the
controlling shareholder stands to receive some financial benefit that is not
proportionally shared with the minority shareholders.
Self-dealing
transactions and conflicts transactions (if the conflict is material) are subject
to review for their entire fairness.
The U.S. government and its various parts, however, have a wide
variety of interests other than financial ones. Indeed, the predominant worry
when the government is the controlling shareholder will not be that the government wants to enrich itself financially at the expense of the minority
shareholders but that the government will induce the corporation to pursue
political or policy goals rather than maximize the corporation’s value for the
proportionate benefit of all of its shareholders. This greatly complicates the
task of courts. Self-dealing transactions and material-conflicts transactions
are relatively easy to identify by objective standards. By contrast, to determine whether a transaction serves the government’s political goals is much
harder. The government’s political goals are both amorphous and farreaching, so that a large number of transactions can plausibly be argued to
serve these goals. Unless all of these transactions are subjected to entirefairness review, the court would have to determine whether the goal is important enough and whether the transaction furthers it sufficiently to warrant
stricter scrutiny. Because neither of these factors is easily or objectively
quantifiable, this is a difficult task.
Finally, review of such conflicts is rendered more difficult because the
government is not a unitary actor. Private controlling shareholders, of
course, are also not unitary actors when they are corporations. But authority
within corporations is hierarchical, so if one agent of the controlling
shareholder corporation acts (i.e., asking the CEO or the board to take a
certain action), her actions can fairly be attributed to the corporation under
normal agency law principles. If the government is the controlling
shareholder, however, there are problems with such attribution. Start with
actions by members of the Executive Branch and assume that the controlling
stake is held somewhere in the Treasury. Should all actions by members of
the Executive Branch be attributed to “the government,” only those actions
originating in the Treasury, or only those originating from the office within
the Department that holds the controlling stake (or anyone above it)? What if
a regulatory agency (within or without the Treasury) requests that the CEO
take certain action? What if that regulator “reminds” the CEO of the
government’s interest as a shareholder?
Issues are even more complicated if the request for an action originates
in the Legislative Branch. Members of Congress can clearly have substantial
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influence over the executives, and management of the controlled company is
well aware of that. When influential members of Congress request that executives of a controlled company take particular actions, the requests will
carry special weight because the government is a controlling shareholder.
Yet, it is unclear how these requests ought to be treated for purposes of
Delaware law.
Cutting in the other direction, government interference is likely to have
different goals than will the classic, overreaching private shareholder who
seeks private gain. When the government interferes, it will typically be in
order to further some conception of the public interest or to reward a favored
actor. In either case, it is not directly lining its own pocket. As we will discuss below, these differences make the fit with Delaware doctrine
particularly awkward.
C. Introduction: The Delaware Corporate Law Structure
Return to our original hypo: the government, the controlling shareholder
of DMAC with 56% of the votes, leans on DMAC to lend to DM and its
dealers and customers on preferential terms in order to benefit DM with a
potential cost to DMAC shareholders. Moreover, the Treasury, with 60% of
the votes, leans on DM to make its product line more environmentally
friendly.
To understand the distinctive challenges posed by government
ownership, we first review the analysis when it involves only private parties.
Under current Delaware law, the hypo poses obvious duty-of-loyalty and
potential duty-of-care problems. Under the duty of loyalty, the controlling
shareholder faces a conflict of interest between its interests in DMAC and its
interests in a separate corporation, DM. The key questions under the duty of
care are whether the controlling shareholder, in forcing DM to change its
product mix, has breached any duty and, if so, whether the controlling shareholder has been or could have been exculpated or indemnified against
damages.
1. The Duty-of-Loyalty Claim.—The treatment of this sort of conflict is
well developed under Delaware corporate law. A shareholder of DMAC
would bring a derivative action in Delaware Chancery Court on behalf of
DMAC against the controlling shareholder (assuming that the controlling
shareholder had enough contacts with Delaware to support personal
jurisdiction), the controlling shareholders’ designees/employees on the board
of directors, and, for good measure, the other directors as well, alleging
breach of the duty of loyalty.
As in any derivative suit, demand on the board is required unless it
would be excused as futile. In this case, demand would probably be excused.
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Ordinarily, Delaware courts apply the so-called Aronson108 test to determine
demand futility. Under Aronson, a derivative plaintiff must allege specific
facts that create a reasonable doubt as to (1) whether a majority of the board
is disinterested or independent, or (2) whether the challenged transaction was
the product of the board’s valid exercise of business judgment.109 When
there is a private controlling shareholder, demand will often be excused under the first prong because directors either have an interest in the transaction
or have other business relationships with the controlling shareholder.110 If
the self-dealing transaction involving a controlling shareholder is substantively analyzed under the entire-fairness test—and thus not protected by the
business-judgment rule—there is a good argument that demand is excused
under the second prong of Aronson.111
If demand were excused, the court would independently evaluate both
the financial terms of the transaction and the process leading up to the transaction to determine if both comply with the entire-fairness standard. In short,
if the transaction were unfair, there is a significant likelihood that the plaintiffs would succeed in either enjoining the transaction or recovering damages.
The robust protections provided by the duty of loyalty are a function of relatively clear rules enforced by private injunctive and damages actions.
This is not a hard case under Delaware law. With its long-standing
focus on controlling self-dealing by interested directors and controlling
shareholders, Delaware has encountered and analyzed a dizzying range of
variations on this basic fact pattern and has developed an intricate set of doctrines that discourage and deter interested fiduciaries from exploiting their
control for nonfirm purposes. In the private context, when, as here, the controlling shareholder has, by hypothesis, directly interfered in order to force a
transaction with a related party on preferential terms and without any independent negotiating structures or noncontrolling shareholder approval, the
liability of the controlling shareholder is so clear that one rarely encounters
such behavior.
2. The Duty-of-Care Claim.—Let us assume that the DM shareholders
turn out to be right that the Treasury’s insistence that new DM make its
product mix much greener is a catastrophic business decision that costs DM
108. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
109. Id. at 814–15.
110. See, e.g., Kahn v. Tremont Corp., No. 12339, 1994 WL 162613, at *4–5 (Del. Ch. Apr. 21,
1994) (finding a group of directors interested for purposes of Aronson’s first prong because of their
various business ties to the controlling shareholder).
111. To our knowledge, no case directly endorses or rejects the proposition that demand is
automatically excused under the second prong of Aronson for self-dealing transactions with
controlling shareholders that, under Kahn v. Lynch Communication Systems, Inc., are always
subjected to entire-fairness review. For a further discussion of this point, see Marcel Kahan &
Edward Rock, When the Government Is the Controlling Shareholder: Implications for Delaware, 35
DEL. J. CORP. L. 409, 415 (2010).
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billions of dollars. Moreover, let us assume that, in retrospect, the decision
was grossly negligent by any measure: there were no market tests to support
the prediction that American consumers would buy such cars from DM; the
controlling shareholder had no expertise and no experts with regard to either
the development, engineering, manufacturing, or marketing of automobiles—
much less green automobiles; and the decision was rushed through with little
deliberation and over the (muted) opposition of long-time executives and
directors. The shareholders would now like to sue. Do they have a decent
claim under existing Delaware law?
This part of the hypo is obviously designed to raise a straightforward
duty-of-care question. There are four parts of the analysis: first, whether the
controlling shareholder in the hypo owes a duty of care; second, whether the
shareholder’s actions violate the duty of care; third, whether any liability for
a violation has been exculpated or otherwise immunized; and fourth, even if
it has, whether injunctive relief is available.112
On the first point, Delaware law is clear that when a controlling
shareholder exercises control over business decisions, the shareholder takes
on the same duties of care that other fiduciaries have.113
As to the duty-of-care analysis itself, as recent cases from Delaware
confirm, Smith v. Van Gorkom114 still provides the standard for liability under
the duty of care: gross negligence.115 The hypo paints the unrealistic situation in which the decision-making process is grossly negligent (if, as stated
above, the negligence is not gross enough, modify it however you wish).
This then moves us to the third issue, namely, whether this conduct
could be exculpated under section 102(b)(7).116 Although current Delaware
case law wrestles with identifying the border between gross negligence
(which can be exculpated) and bad faith (which cannot),117 the hypo can be
decided on a simpler basis: section 102(b)(7) does not apply to a controlling
shareholder. By its terms, it only permits exculpation of directors.118

112. As the suit would be derivative, the preceding discussion on whether demand would be
excused applies.
113. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., No. 8358, 1991 WL 111134, at *19 (Del. Ch. June 24,
1991) (“[W]hen a shareholder, who achieves power through the ownership of stock, exercises that
power by directing the actions of the corporation, he assumes the duties of care and loyalty of a
director of the corporation.”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds sub nom. Cede & Co. v.
Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993); see also Pfeffer v. Redstone, 965 A.2d 676, 691 n.52
(Del. 2009) (citing Cinerama, Inc. approvingly for this proposition).
114. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
115. See, e.g., MCG Capital Corp. v. Maginn, No. 4521-CC, 2010 WL 1782271, at *21 n.129
(Del. Ch. May 5, 2010) (citing Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 873) (“Typically one cannot prove a
breach of the duty of care without demonstrating that the directors were grossly negligent with
respect to a particular transaction.”).
116. Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 239 (Del. 2009).
117. Id. at 239–42.
118. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2009).
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A more interesting issue is posed if we assume that the controlling
shareholder is indemnified by DMAC.119 Under Delaware law, two problems stand in the way of such indemnification. First, under section 145,
indemnification is only permitted for a person who is sued “by reason of the
fact that the person is or was a director, officer, employee or agent of the
corporation.”120 In our hypo, it is not obvious that the controlling shareholder is an agent of the corporation and, by design, is not a director, officer,
or employee. Second, indemnification is limited to situations in which the
person “acted in good faith and in a manner the person reasonably believed
to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the corporation.”121 This latter
analysis poses some of the same questions regarding the line between gross
negligence and bad faith that have been featured in the Delaware case law on
section 102(b)(7).122
Finally, even if the controlling shareholder is somehow indemnified
against liability, injunctive relief against grossly negligent conduct is still
available, at least in principle. Although there are no recent examples of injunctions granted in remotely similar situations,123 the courts have shown a
willingness to enjoin what are, in essence, duty-of-care violations in the
mergers-and-acquisitions context, as, for instance, when a transaction is
enjoined because directors have not complied with their Revlon duties, even
if the same conduct will not be considered bad faith for purposes of
exculpation.124
3. The Duty-of-Good-Faith Claim.—The request by the Treasury that
DM not close factories in certain states that are deemed important either to
national economic policy or to the President’s reelection is hardest to categorize under Delaware law. One could argue that the Treasury is subject to a
material conflict of interest, albeit not a financial one, and thus has the bur-

119. If new DM goes bankrupt again because of its switch to green cars, the indemnification—
even if permitted—will not be of any use.
120. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a).
121. Id.
122. See, e.g., Lyondell, 970 A.2d at 240 (discussing the “range of conduct” that encompasses
bad faith and gross negligence).
123. For an example in which a court refused to enjoin a fairly transparently foolish business
decision, see Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 781 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968).
124. See, e.g., Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1095 (Del. 2001) (noting that a
section 102(b)(7) waiver “would not affect injunctive proceedings based on gross negligence”);
Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 35–37, 56–58 (Del. 1994)
(affirming a preliminary injunction granted for the breach of so-called Revlon duties); Leslie v.
Telephonics Office Techs., Inc., 1993 WL 547188, at *9 (Del. Ch. 1993) (“[T]o the extent plaintiffs
seek equitable relief for any alleged breaches of the duty of care, . . . [a section 102(b)(7) waiver]
would not bar them.”); cf. E. Norman Veasey et al., Delaware Supports Directors with a ThreeLegged Stool of Limited Liability, Indemnification, and Insurance, 42 BUS. LAW. 399, 403 (1987)
(arguing that, in spite of section 102(b)(7), the duty of care “will continue to be vitally important in
injunction and rescission cases”).
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den of showing the entire fairness of the factory-closing policies it is
pursuing. While this is doctrinally cogent, we think that the better analytical
category for this action can be found in the newly developed Delaware
jurisprudence on bad faith. Actions taken in bad faith are not protected by
the business-judgment rule (nor insulated from liability under section
102(b)(7)) and are a subcategory of breaches of the duty of loyalty.
In the recent Delaware Supreme Court opinion Stone v. Ritter,125 the
court elaborated on the concept of bad faith. It explained that bad faith may
be shown where
[t]he fiduciary intentionally acts with a purpose other than that of
advancing the best interests of the corporation, where the fiduciary
acts with the intent to violate applicable positive law, or where the
fiduciary intentionally fails to act in the face of known duty to act,
demonstrating a conscious disregard for his duties.126
In our hypothetical, the request by the Treasury fits squarely into the
first of these categories of bad faith, though in the real world, the facts will
rarely be so clear.
D. The Direct Challenge: The U.S. Treasury’s Obligations as Controlling
Shareholder
As this brief analysis of Delaware law suggests, a plaintiff could bring a
plausible derivative suit alleging a breach of fiduciary duty against a private
controlling shareholder in the facts set forth in the hypo, would stand an excellent chance of establishing that demand is excused, and would have a
nontrivial chance of prevailing on the substantive claim.
How does this change now that the controlling shareholder is the
government? The short answer: in more ways than you can begin to
imagine! Below, we explore those differences. As we will explain, to sue
the government, a private plaintiff would have to overcome the protections
the government has granted itself under the heading of sovereign immunity
and may not be able to proceed in the Delaware state court.127 Before we
pursue this analysis, however, we want to stress that even in the “ideal”
scenario in which a plaintiff could go to a Delaware court that would apply
ordinary Delaware law, a suit against the U.S. government as controlling
shareholder faces special problems.

125. 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006).
126. Id. at 369 (quoting In re Walt Disney Co., 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006)).
127. For an excellent and comprehensive analysis of the substantive and procedural law
governing claims against the federal government, see GREGORY C. SISK, LITIGATION WITH THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (4th ed. 2006). Much of the following discussion is indebted to Sisk’s
analysis.
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1. Delaware Law and the U.S. Government.—Most lawsuits for
breaches of fiduciary duty in a public Delaware corporation are brought in
the Delaware Court of Chancery, a court that specializes in corporate law and
has widely acknowledged expertise in dealing with such suits. But even
apart from the jurisdictional problems addressed below, the Delaware Court
of Chancery is less than the ideal venue for pursuing fiduciary-duty claims
against the U.S. government. The state of Delaware derives substantial revenues from its franchise tax (paid mostly by public corporations). In 2010,
Delaware received revenues of $633.1 million or about 20% of the state’s
budget.128 Delaware is obviously keen on having these revenues flow into its
coffers.
Delaware is able to charge corporations significant franchise fees
because its corporate law and the quality of its judiciary are considered
superior to the law and the judiciary of other states. However, as Mark Roe
has forcefully pointed out, Delaware’s franchise-tax business lives by the
grace of the federal government.129 Congress could, in one fell swoop, wipe
out this business by federalizing corporate law. Congress, of course, has not
done so and, as we have argued, is unlikely to do so under ordinary political
circumstances.130 This being said, Delaware clearly has an incentive to avoid
annoying the U.S. government or even to avoid action that may annoy the
U.S. government.
The members of Delaware’s judiciary are usually former lawyers or
government officials who are well aware of the state’s interest. Thus, one
may wonder whether the Delaware court, consciously or subconsciously,
may deal with suits against the U.S. government for breaches of fiduciary
duty less strictly than with equivalent suits against private parties. When the
law or the facts are unclear, there will be an inherent temptation not to pick a
fight with someone who can cut off so much of your funding. Accordingly,
even if a plaintiff could bring a lawsuit against the U.S. government in the
Delaware state court, she may be well-advised to seek a different forum.
In addition, Delaware doctrinal law is—at least at present—not well
equipped to handle the kind of conflicts that would arise when the government is the controlling shareholder. This is illustrated by our hypothetical
request to avoid factory closures in states that are politically important for the
government, either because of public policy or partisan political

128. DEL. DEP’T OF FIN., DELAWARE FISCAL NOTEBOOK 29 (2010), available at
http://finance.delaware.gov/publications/fiscal_notebook_10/fiscal_notebook_10.pdf.
129. See Mark Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 600–07 (2004)
(explaining that federal legislation could easily displace Delaware corporate law and that the mere
fear of this possibility influences Delaware lawmakers to avoid provoking federal authorities).
130. See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of Corporate
Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1573, 1576 (2005) (“We argue that the possibility of federal preemption
constitutes a threat to Delaware, but this threat is significant only in times . . . when systemic change
is seen as generating a significant populist payoff.”).
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considerations. When the government, as controlling shareholder, interferes
in business decisions, many conflicts of interest will be based on political
interests—such as in this hypothetical—rather than financial—such as in the
hypothetical of the loan by DMAC.
But it is hard for judges, including Delaware’s, to evaluate such political
interference. Virtually any action taken by the government has some plausible political motive. How does a judge evaluate the materiality of conflicts
when the conflict is nonfinancial? Should the judge determine the importance of the political motive on its own or in relation to nonpolitical motives?
And important to whom? The Secretary of the Treasury, the President, or the
President’s chief pollster? What evidence can be adduced? Can all government officials be deposed and internal records be requested? It is clear that
problems abound.
As a result, even if the government were treated doctrinally like any
other controlling shareholder, governmental control of companies with minority shareholders would raise special problems. But as discussed below,
the government is treated rather differently. This, alas, magnifies the
problems. As we have argued elsewhere, because Delaware is bound to lose
any confrontation with Washington, it is well-advised to avoid such fights,
preferably through reliance on discretion within procedural rules rather than
through a distortion of its corporate law doctrine.131
2. Sovereign Immunity and Its Limits: Claims Against the U.S.
Government.—The starting point for any analysis involving suits against
government entities is the doctrine of sovereign immunity, which holds that
the U.S. government cannot be sued except insofar as it has waived its
immunity.132 Through various statutes, the U.S. government has waived
much of its immunity, but not all, and always with limitations.
Moreover, because of the general immunity, any waivers are narrowly
construed and burdened with conditions. The principal waivers of sovereign
immunity are contained within the FTCA, which, broadly speaking, permits
suits against the United States for tortious acts by its agents;133 the Tucker
Act, which permits claims against the United States for damages not involv-

131. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 63, at 756 (commenting favorably on Delaware Vice
Chancellor Parsons’s decision to allow a New York court to decide a question of Delaware law in
order to avoid a dilemma that pitted state precedent against prudent public policy); Kahan & Rock,
supra note 130, at 1621 (“If Delaware is not able to regulate certain conduct effectively, it is
probably in its interest to have this conduct regulated on the federal level (or by other states) to fill
the lacunae in its own law.”); Kahan & Rock, supra note 111, at 410 (urging Delaware to “duck”
confrontations with Washington and providing suggestions on how to do so).
132. See United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941) (“The United States, as
sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued . . . .”); 14 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT,
ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3654 (3d ed.
1998) (“[T]he United States may not be sued without its consent.”).
133. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2006).
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ing tortious conduct (which includes, inter alia, contract claims and takings
claims);134 and the APA, which permits actions against the United States for
review of agency action seeking relief other than money damages.135 As we
will discuss below, each of these frameworks complicates actions against the
United States for acts that, under Delaware corporate law, could constitute
breaches of the duty of loyalty or care.
a. Jurisdiction and Venue: The Limitation of Delaware’s Role.—A
key dimension of sovereign immunity that remains in force is choice of
forum. The United States has never waived its immunity to suit in state
court. Rather, under 28 U.S.C. § 1346, all suits against the United States
must be brought either in federal district court or the Court of Federal
Claims, depending on the cause of action. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1442, any
claim against the United States filed in state court can be removed to federal
district court. Once in the federal system, who, if anyone, can plaintiffs sue
and for what? Here the real complexity begins. In the following subsections,
we will analyze potential claims under the three principal statutory headings:
the FTCA, the Tucker Act, and the APA.136
b. FTCA Claims.
i. Is a Breach of Fiduciary Duty a “Tort”?—The
FTCA waives sovereign immunity for “tort claims.” The key substantive
provision is provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2674, which states that
The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title
relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a
private individual under like circumstances, but shall not be liable for
interest prior to judgment or for punitive damages.

134. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2006).
135. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006).
136. These provisions cannot be avoided by suing government agents rather than the
government. The Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), fiction that a suit against a government
agent is not a suit against the government was essentially eliminated by the provision for direct
review of agency action under 5 U.S.C. § 702 (as we discuss further below). This is complemented
by the Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act, Pub. L. No. 100-694, 102
Stat. 4563 (1988), which provides that
Upon certification by the Attorney General that the defendant employee was acting
within the scope of his office or employment at the time of the incident out of which
the claim arose, any civil action or proceeding commenced upon such claim in a State
court shall be removed without bond at any time before trial by the Attorney General to
the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place
in which the action or proceeding is pending. Such action or proceeding shall be
deemed to be an action or proceeding brought against the United States under the
provisions of this title and all references thereto, and the United States shall be
substituted as the party defendant. This certification of the Attorney General shall
conclusively establish scope of office or employment for purposes of removal.
28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(2). This Act is commonly known as the Westfall Act.
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The key jurisdictional provision is provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1),
which decrees exclusive federal jurisdiction. The first challenge, then, is
determining whether breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims are “tort” claims.137
This is a conceptually interesting and complex question that does not have a
clear answer.
As a historical matter, breach of fiduciary duty is not a tort. It is an
equitable rather than a legal claim and predates the sources of modern tort
law, namely, trespass and trespass on the case.138
As a conceptual matter, it is also pretty clear that breaches of fiduciary
duties are not torts, at least not in the common law use of that term, although
they may be “civil wrongs.”139 Indeed, if one carefully distinguishes between
fiduciary duties and the duties of fiduciaries, one can identify core duties
created by the fiduciary relationship that are, in fact, separate and apart from
duties created by tort or contract law. On the other hand, the conceptual argument may prove too much, at least for Delaware law: when one carefully
defines fiduciary duty, many argue that the trustee’s or fiduciary’s duty of
care is not, properly speaking, a fiduciary duty at all, although it may well be
a duty that a fiduciary has.140

137. Sovereign immunity to claims under the Securities Exchange Act has not been waived for
two reasons. First, under § 3(c), the U.S. Treasury is exempt from liability under § 10(b). 15
U.S.C. § 78c(c) (2006). Second, the FTCA explicitly exempts claims of misrepresentation or deceit
from the waiver of sovereign immunity. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). This includes both negligent and
intentional misrepresentations, as well as omissions of material fact. McNeily v. United States, 6
F.3d 343, 347 (5th Cir. 1993).
138. Cf. Joshua Getzler, Rumford Market and the Genesis of Fiduciary Obligation (describing
how fiduciary law was created in equity and stretches further back than originally expected and
even precedes the law of trusteeship itself), in MAPPING THE LAW: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF PETER
BIRKS 577, 596–97 (Andrew Burrows & Alan Rodger eds., 2006).
139. See, e.g., Peter Birks, The Content of Fiduciary Obligation, 34 ISR. L. REV. 3, 3 (2000)
(“Fiduciary obligations form a sub-set of those primary obligations the breach of which constitutes a
civil wrong.”); P.D. Finn, The Fiduciary Principle, in EQUITY, FIDUCIARIES, AND TRUSTS 1, 24–25
(T.G. Youdan ed., 1989); Sarah Worthington, Fiduciaries: When Is Self-Denial Obligatory? 58
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 500, 503 (1999) (“In short, fiduciary terminology should be used carefully and
restrictively, so that fiduciary law operates only to exact loyalty; it does not concern itself with
matters of contract, tort, unjust enrichment and other equitable obligations (such as breach of
confidence).”); cf. R.P. Austin, Moulding the Content of Fiduciary Duties (“The fiduciary duties
relate to improper profits and the avoidance of conflicts of interest, and we should no longer use
fiduciary terminology to describe other duties to which fiduciaries and others may be subject.”), in
A.J. OAKLEY, TRENDS IN CONTEMPORARY TRUST LAW 153, 156 (1996). Birks provides a
different, although related, analysis of the content of the fiduciary obligation. For Birks, fiduciary
duty is derivative from the duty of the trustee of an express trust. Birks, supra, at 3. By contrast,
Getzler suggests that the evidence equally supports the view that fiduciary duty predates, and forms
an essential component of, the creation of express trusts and the duties of the trustee. Getzler, supra
note 138, at 577. For a U.S. perspective with U.S. citations, see Roy Ryden Anderson & Walter W.
Steele, Fiduciary Duty, Tort and Contract: A Primer on the Legal Malpractice Puzzle, 47 S.M.U. L.
REV. 235, 235 (1994).
140. See, e.g., Birks, supra note 139, at 5 (discussing how imprecise definitions of fiduciary
obligations could cause the law governing fiduciary obligations to “duplicat[e] the work of the
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More recently, the issue of how to categorize a breach of fiduciary duty
has arisen in connection with the question of whether a statute of limitations
applies to breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims and, if so, which statute. Older
cases held that statutes of limitations do not apply in equity, which instead
relies on the more flexible doctrine of laches.141 Over time, as the jurisdiction of equity courts has expanded, as in Delaware, this distinction has
broken down. Under current Delaware law, the Delaware Court of Chancery
looks to legal statutes of limitations as establishing a presumption for the application of laches to equitable claims,142 although with a heavy dose of
equity in its liberal rules for tolling.
This evolution has forced courts to reach the question of which statute
of limitations to apply or look to for guidance. In some states, courts have
applied the tort statute.143 Other courts have applied the statute of limitations
for contracts.144 Finally, others, including Delaware, have applied a more
general, catch-all limitation rule, even when a specific tort rule exists.145
Statutes of limitations, then, provide an uncertain guide to whether breachof-fiduciary-duty claims are tort claims.
But history, conceptual analysis, or analogous situations under state law
cannot alone determine whether the use of the term tort in the FTCA was
intended to include or should be read to include breaches of fiduciary duty.
Rather, the question is whether the FTCA should, as a matter of statutory
interpretation, be viewed as waiving immunity for breaches of fiduciary duty.
This question is linked to whether breach-of-fiduciary-duty cases can be
ordinary law of tort” and referencing the leading case, Bristol & West Bldg. Soc’y v. Motthew,
[1996] Ch. 1 (Eng.), against such “indefensible duplication”).
141. See Kahn v. Seaboard Corp., 625 A.2d 269, 271–75 (Del. Ch. 1993) (providing a very
perceptive discussion of the older cases pertaining to this doctrine).
142. Albert v. Alex Brown Mgmt. Servs., No. Civ.A. 762-N, 2005 WL 1594085, at *12 (Del.
Ch. Aug. 26, 2005); see also Kahn, 625 A.2d at 275. For a good discussion of the more general
phenomenon, see Matthew G. Dore, Statutes of Limitation and Corporate Fiduciary Duty Claims: A
Search for Middle Ground on the Rules/Standards Continuum, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 695, 720–41
(1997).
143. See, e.g., FDIC v. Dawson, 4 F.3d 1303, 1310 (5th Cir. 1993) (addressing claims against
the directors and officers of a failed bank that sounded in tort and were therefore governed by
Texas’s two-year statute of limitations); Crosby v. Beam, 615 N.E.2d 294, 299–300 (Ohio Ct. App.
1992) (holding that a minority stockholder’s claims against corporate directors, officers, and the
corporate entity were governed by Ohio’s four-year tort statute of limitations).
144. See, e.g., RTC v. Armbruster, 52 F.3d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that claims
against the directors of a failed savings and loan were governed by Arkansas’s three-year limitations
provision for contract actions); Bibo v. Jeffrey’s Rest., 770 P.2d 290, 295 (Alaska 1989) (addressing
claims, against corporate directors, that were governed by Alaska’s six-year statute of limitations
for contract actions).
145. See, e.g., Kahn, 625 A.2d at 277 (applying a general three-year limitation period rather
than the two-year period governing torts such as wrongful death, injury to personal property, and
personal injuries). More recently, Travis Laster and Michelle Morris have argued persuasively that,
at least in terms of Delaware’s Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, breaches of fiduciary
duty should be treated as “equitable torts.” See J. Travis Laster & Michelle D. Morris, Breaches of
Fiduciary Duty and the Delaware Uniform Contribution Act, 11 DEL. L. REV. 71 (2010).
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brought under the second major infringement on sovereign immunity, the
Tucker Act, because the Tucker Act is explicitly complementary and
nonoverlapping.146 Unfortunately, the legislative history of the FTCA seems
to be entirely silent on the question, focusing instead on whether the government should assume liability for automobile accidents: “With the expansion
of governmental activities in recent years, it becomes especially important to
grant to private individuals the right to sue the Government in respect to such
torts as negligence in the operation of vehicles.”147
The Indian Trust cases148—a line of cases that have been uniformly
brought under the Tucker Act (which we will discuss later)—cast some light.
In those cases, Native American tribes sued, alleging that the U.S.
government had breached fiduciary duties owed to the Indian tribes in the
stewardship of tribes’ land and natural resources. Thus, for example, in
United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell II),149 members of the Quinault Tribe alleged that the U.S. government had breached its fiduciary duties to them by
failing to manage their allotted lands properly, a claim the Supreme Court
accepted.150 If, under Mitchell II, a breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim can be
brought under the Tucker Act, then it must be a claim for damages “not
sounding in tort.”151
Mitchell II, however, involved an explicit, federal statutory acceptance
of a fiduciary relationship toward the tribe members. It may be that it was
the presence of this specific statute rather than the general nature of the claim
that brought it under the Tucker Act.152 Indeed, there is some Tucker Act
law that narrowly construes the Indian Trust cases and holds that generally
claims of breaches of fiduciary duty, if they give rise to any claim, give rise
to torts.153 Along these same lines, the Delaware Court of Chancery,
interpreting and applying a Massachusetts statute that limited the liability of
charities in tort actions, held that (at least under Massachusetts law) breach of

146. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2006) (“The United States Court of Federal Claims shall have
jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the United States . . . for liquidated or
unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.” (emphasis added)).
147. H.R. REP. NO. 77-2245, at 7 (1942).
148. See infra subsection III(D)(2)(c).
149. 463 U.S. 206 (1983).
150. Id. at 210–11.
151. Id. at 212.
152. Of course, that a state common-law-based breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim cannot be
brought under the Tucker Act does not mean that it can be brought under the FTCA. It could fall
between two stools, always a possibility given the background of sovereign immunity and the
narrow interpretation of any derogations. See, e.g., Kashin v. Kent, 457 F.3d 1033, 1037, 1044 (9th
Cir. 2006) (holding that a tort action against a federal employee involved in a car accident in Russia
was barred by the FTCA’s foreign-country exception).
153. See Am. Ins. Co. v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 151, 158 (2004) (“For one thing, such
general breaches of claimed fiduciary or equitable duties are ordinarily viewed as giving rise, if
anything, to torts, the subject matter of which plainly is outside this court’s jurisdiction.”).
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fiduciary duty could be considered a tort for the purposes of the statute.154
The question of how breach-of-fiduciary-duty actions fit within the federal
waivers of sovereign immunity is thus uncertain.
But suppose, arguendo, that a breach of the duty of loyalty will be
viewed as a tort for the purposes of the FTCA. Which state’s fiduciary law
would apply? Suppose that the plaintiff alleges that the responsible Treasury
officials breached their fiduciary duties while in Detroit for a board meeting.
According to § 1346(b)(1), whether the act or omission is a tort is determined
by whether “a private person[] would be liable to the claimant in accordance
with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.”155 This provision points to Michigan as the relevant state. But, as a leading Supreme
Court case points out, in determining the relevant law for the FTCA, you take
into account the whole law of the state, including its choice-of-law rules.156
Because Michigan, like most states, follows the “place of incorporation”
doctrine in determining applicable corporate law157 and because DM and
DMAC are both, by hypothesis, Delaware corporations, Delaware law would
provide the rule of decision.
ii. The “discretionary function” exception.—But a
plaintiff is hardly home free. Under § 2680(a), the FTCA does not apply to
“[a]ny claim . . . based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to
exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal
agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion
involved be abused.”158 This defense, known as the “discretionary function
exception,” provides a very important limitation on the reach of the FTCA.
Indeed, depending on how broadly it is interpreted, the exception could
swallow the whole waiver of sovereign immunity.
Assuming, as we do above, that the Treasury officials who make the
decision to compel DMAC to lend to DM and its customers and dealers on
preferential terms are employees (whether or not they are also directors),
does the discretionary function exception apply?
There is a fairly long line of Supreme Court cases interpreting this
language in an attempt to draw a line between protecting public officials’
policy choices that have winners and losers, without also immunizing negligent conduct that injures innocent bystanders. Thus, in Dalehite v. United
States,159 at issue was a conscious decision to cut corners in order to reduce

154. Oliver v. Boston Univ., C.A. No. 16570-NC, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 14, at *9–11 (Del. Ch.
Jan. 28, 2005).
155. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2006).
156. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11 (1962).
157. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 306, 309 (1971).
158. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).
159. 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
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costs in the manufacture of fertilizer to be shipped abroad, a decision that
resulted in a cargo ship exploding in the harbor and causing damage.160 In
holding that the decision was protected by the discretionary function
exception, the Court drew a distinction between the “planning level,” which
was protected by the exception, and the “operational level,” which was
not.161 Later, in United States v. Varig Airlines,162 the Court rejected an
FTCA claim for negligent certification of an aircraft and added that the
purpose of the exception was to protect the government from judicial secondguessing of legislative and administrative decisions that were grounded in
economic and political policy.163 Even later, in Berkovitz v. United States,164
the Court examined a claim that the FDA had negligently licensed a vaccine
manufacturer and negligently approved the release of a particular batch of
vaccine.165 The Court limited the exception to “discretionary” decisions—
where the decision involved was a matter of permissible choice for a
government employee—and refused to apply it to mandatory decisions that
must be made on the basis of objective criteria when there is no permissible
discretion.166
The Court once again tried to define the limits of the exception in its
most recent effort, United States v. Gaubert,167 which emerged out of the
Savings and Loan Crisis of the 1980s. In Gaubert, the founder and largest
shareholder of a savings and loan accused the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board (FHLBB) (the now-superseded agency then charged with regulating
savings and loan associations) of negligence in its supervision of the savings
and loan. According to the shareholder, the FHLBB interfered in day-to-day
operations of the savings and loan, pressured the savings and loan to merge,
threatened to close it unless the managers and board resigned, influenced the
selection of new management, and ultimately caused the savings and loan to
fail.
The Supreme Court rejected the claims and stated that “when
established governmental policy, as expressed or implied by statute,
regulation, or agency guidelines, allows a Government agent to exercise
discretion, it must be presumed that the agent’s acts are grounded in policy
when exercising that discretion.”168
The Gaubert standard—criticized in the literature as too deferential in
creating a perhaps irrebuttable presumption that discretion was exercised
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id. at 22–23.
Id. at 42.
467 U.S. 797 (1984).
Id. at 814.
486 U.S. 531 (1988).
Id.
Id. at 535–37.
499 U.S. 315 (1991).
Id. at 324.
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when the decision was of a type that is susceptible to policy analysis, even
when there is no evidence that the agent actually engaged in any such
analysis169—provides the current boundaries of the exception. Interestingly,
for our purposes, it does so in a context that is at least superficially quite
similar to the current state of affairs—efforts by government officials to work
through a banking crisis.
With respect to the duty-of-care claim, Gaubert would seem to provide
a very strong defense. In Gaubert, a founder and large shareholder of a
savings and loan alleged that the FHLBB’s day-to-day second-guessing and
interference caused the savings and loan to fail. Nonetheless, the court held
that the FHLBB was protected under the discretionary function exception.170
Here, as there, one could argue, the exception would apply because, as
Gaubert held, “it must be presumed that the agent’s acts are grounded in
policy when exercising that discretion.”171 The decision to adopt a greener
product mix is surely no less entitled to the discretionary function exception
than interfering in the day-to-day operation of a savings and loan.
On the other hand, Gaubert involved a governmental agency that used
its discretion in the exercise of its regulatory function. Whether the rationale
of Gaubert and the other cases applies with equal force to governmental officials who act outside their regulatory purview—say Treasury officials with
respect to the type of car to be produced and the location of factories to be
closed—is unclear.
iii. Are the actions in the hypo choices from “a range
of permissible courses”?—The duty-of-loyalty claim is more complicated.
Were the actions of the Treasury officials, in leaning on DMAC to lend to
DM, its dealers, and its customers, pursuant to a regulation that allowed the
exercise of discretion and policy judgment by the employee or agent? How
do the agents’ actions compare to those of the FHLBB in overseeing the
failing savings and loan? According to the Gaubert court, “day-to-day
management of banking affairs, like the management of other businesses,
regularly requires judgment as to which of a range of permissible courses is
the wisest. Discretionary conduct is not confined to the policy or planning
level.”172

169. See, e.g., Harold J. Krent, Preserving Discretion Without Sacrificing Deterrence: Federal
Governmental Liability in Tort, 38 UCLA L. REV. 871, 898 n.117 (1991) (arguing that the Gaubert
standard “provides an insufficient limiting principle” because nearly any action can somehow be
shown to be tied to a policy motivation); Peter H. Schuck & James J. Park, The Discretionary
Function Exception in the Second Circuit, 20 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 55, 65–66 (2000) (illustrating
how even the most routine actions can be grounded in general policy concerns).
170. Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 326.
171. Id. at 324.
172. Id. at 325.

2011]

When the Government Is the Controlling Shareholder

1333

In our hypo, did the Treasury agents exercise judgment in choosing the
wisest of a range of permissible options? Here, we get to a very interesting
feature of the government’s involvement in the automobile industry. From a
legal and regulatory perspective, that involvement has been ad hoc, even perhaps haphazard. As a result, the relevant statutory authority provides unclear
guidance on what courses of action are permissible.
When the EESA was enacted in October 2008, Congress was led to
believe that the $700 billion would be used to buy up toxic assets, thereby
freeing banks to lend again. The original conception for the TARP program
and the basis upon which it was presented to Congress173 was to give the
Treasury authority and funding to purchase illiquid assets from troubled
financial institutions.
As noted above, the operative provisions of the statute reflect this
understanding. There is plenty of legislative history that is consistent with
this reading. Even worse, prior to launching the AIFP, the Treasury sought
congressional approval of an automobile bailout and was sharply rebuffed.174
As George Will has argued, in November 2008, Paulson specifically told a
House committee, “‘I’ve said to you very clearly that I believe that the auto
companies fall outside of [TARP’s] purpose.’ Then advocates of a Detroit
bailout proposed legislation to authorize that. It failed.”175
As Will pointed out, and as the objectors in the Chrysler bailout
argued,176 the creation of the AIFP to bail out car companies does not find
much of a basis in the statute. One can credibly argue that purchasing equity
securities is permitted under the EESA, even though the original plan was to
purchase asset-backed securities clogging up the banks’ balance sheets. As
discussed above, the statutory definition of troubled assets is quite broad, and
equity securities could well be a “financial instrument that the Secretary,
after consultation with the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, determines the purchase of which is necessary to
promote financial market stability.”177 But this power is limited to purchasing troubled assets from “financial institutions,” and it takes extraordinarily
creative statutory interpretation to find that automobile companies are finan-

173. According to Sorkin, by the time that Congress approved the EESA, the Treasury had
already decided to shift the focus to direct investments in troubled financial institutions. SORKIN,
supra note 69, at 508–16.
174. David Herszenhorn, Chances Dwindle on Bailout Plan for Automakers, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 13, 2008, at A1.
175. George F. Will, More Judicial Activism, Please, WASH. POST, June 14, 2009, at A15
(alteration in original).
176. See, e.g., Corrected Objection of Ind. Pensioners to Debtor’s Motion for an Order at 17–
27, In re Chrysler, LLC, No. 09-50002 (AJG), (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2009).
177. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 3(9)(B),
122 Stat. 3765, 3767 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5202(9)(B)).
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cial institutions lurking in the phrase “included but not limited to,” however
troubled they may be.
Not surprisingly, given the uncertain (or perhaps absent) statutory basis
for the use of TARP funds for auto-company bailouts, EESA does not provide the same sort of comprehensive regulatory structure for the resolution or
conservation of troubled automobile companies that is provided to bank regulators under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act or the parallel statutes
governing other banking agencies. Given this lack, can the Treasury agents
who decided to use DMAC funds to help out DM find protection in the
discretionary function exception? In the words of Gaubert, do the operative
provisions of EESA provide agents of the Treasury with the sort of discretion
that “regularly requires judgment as to which of a range of permissible
courses is the wisest”?178
As before, one can argue it either way. On the one hand, because the
Congress that enacted the EESA never thought that the money would be used
to buy controlling equity stakes in private companies—neither controlling
stakes in financial institutions such as AIG or GMAC nor controlling positions in automobile companies like GM—there is nothing in EESA that
addresses how the Treasury is to manage its equity portfolio. The closest
that the EESA comes to a provision providing guidance is § 106, “Rights;
Management; Sale of Troubled Assets; Revenues and Sale Proceeds”:
(a) EXERCISE OF RIGHTS.—The Secretary may, at any time,
exercise any rights received in connection with troubled assets
purchased under this Act.
(b) MANAGEMENT OF TROUBLED ASSETS.—The Secretary
shall have authority to manage troubled assets purchased under this
Act, including revenues and portfolio risks therefrom.179
But, while § 106 authorizes the Secretary to manage the assets, it does
not address how the Secretary is to address relations among portfolio companies and thus arguably does not provide guidance, even general guidance, to
a Treasury agent in exercising discretion to achieve the goals.
On the other hand, EESA does address conflicts of interest. Section
108, “Conflicts of Interest,” provides,
(a) STANDARDS REQUIRED.—The Secretary shall issue
regulations or guidelines necessary to address and manage or to
prohibit conflicts of interest that may arise in connection with the
administration and execution of the authorities provided under this
Act, including—
(1) conflicts arising in the selection or hiring of contractors or
advisors, including asset managers;

178. United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 325 (1991).
179. EESA § 106(a)–(b), 122 Stat. at 3773 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5216(a)–(b)).
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(2) the purchase of troubled assets;
(3) the management of the troubled assets held;
(4) post-employment restrictions on employees; and
(5) any other potential conflict of interest, as the Secretary deems
necessary or appropriate in the public interest.
(b) TIMING.—Regulations or guidelines required by this section shall
be issued as soon as practicable after the date of enactment of this
Act.180
On January 21, 2009, the Treasury issued an “interim rule” that
addresses “conflicts that may arise during the selection of individuals or
entities seeking a contract or financial agency agreement with the Treasury
(retained entities), particularly those involved in the acquisition, valuation,
management, and disposition of troubled assets.”181 In particular, the interim
rules deal with conflicts of interest that individuals and firms who have been
retained by the Treasury may face. These rules are reasonably detailed and
provide a fairly comprehensive structure for existing and future conflicts of
interest faced by individuals or firms retained by the Treasury to work on
TARP matters and impose a variety of restrictions on working for other firms
with conflicting interests and on the use of confidential information. By
contrast, there is nothing at all in the interim rules that relates to the
Treasury’s own potential conflicts of interest with respect to portfolio
companies.
On the other hand, TARP is a work in progress and this lacuna could be
remedied easily enough. Suppose additional rules were issued by the
Secretary pursuant to EESA § 108 that granted Treasury agents managing
TARP assets the same flexibility and open-ended discretion as provided for
in the AIG Trust Agreement:
[I]t is the FRBNY’s view that (x) maximizing the Company’s ability
to honor its commitments to, and repay all amounts owed to, the
FRBNY or the Treasury Department and (y) the Company being
managed in a manner that will not disrupt financial market conditions,
are both consistent with maximizing the value of the Trust Stock.182
Assume, additionally, that the rules set the same standard of care,
according to which the agent must “(i) act[] in good faith in a manner the
[agent] reasonably believed to be . . . in or not opposed to the best interests of
the Treasury and (ii) ha[ve] no reasonable cause to believe his or her conduct
[is] unlawful.”183

180. Id. § 108, 122 Stat. at 3774 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5218).
181. TARP Conflicts of Interest, 74 Fed. Reg. 3,431, 3,431 (Jan. 21, 2009) (to be codified at 31
C.F.R. pt. 31). To date, the “interim rules” have not been updated or made “final.”
182. AIG Credit Facility Trust Agreement § 2.04 (Jan. 16, 2009), available at
http://www.ny.frb.org/newsevents/news/markets/2009/AIGCFTAgreement.pdf.
183. Id. § 3.03.
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Interestingly, of course, while these provisions would fill out the duties
of the Treasury agents managing the Treasury portfolio, they do not provide
clear guidance in our situation. In particular, if using power over DMAC to
benefit DM clearly violates the controlling shareholder’s fiduciary duties under Delaware law, is the conduct “unlawful”? And, if it is unlawful, does it
fall outside the stipulated standard of care? And, finally, if it falls outside the
standard of care imposed on the Treasury agents, are the agents still entitled
to the discretionary function exception?
Consider one final variation. Suppose that the Treasury rules were to
state straightforwardly that Treasury agents, in managing the Treasury’s
equity portfolio, are to respect the principles of corporate law and
governance and to act with due care and loyalty. Interestingly, if these were
the marching orders, the defense under the discretionary function exception
would be very strong. After all, the implementation of the duties of care and
loyalty under Delaware law is rife with discretion and fact-specific
determinations. The entire-fairness test is an ex post standard as opposed to
an ex ante rule. In its various formulations, it sets a broad standard (fairness
of price and fairness of process), allocates burdens, and examines specific
transactions.
After working through the considerable complexity involved in
challenging the Treasury’s hypothetical conduct under the FTCA, only two
things are clear. First, even with regard to a fairly clear violation of the duty
of loyalty or care, success is hardly assured. One can imagine a court coming out either way. Second, given the procedural and substantive
complexities described above, one can hardly expect that an FTCA suit will
provide the first line of defense against problematic conduct. Put somewhat
differently, if we are concerned that the government, using its controlling
stake, will take actions driven by policy objectives that are not in the interests
of the portfolio company, we probably should not depend on a breach-offiduciary-duty action under the FTCA to protect against this possibility.
c. Potential Tucker Act Fiduciary-Duty Claims.—We now turn to
the Tucker Act, the second main waiver of sovereign immunity.
Specifically, § 1491(a) provides,
The United States Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction to
render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded
either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation
of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract
with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in
cases not sounding in tort.184

184. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a) (2006).
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If a breach of fiduciary duty is not a tort for the purposes of the FTCA,
can an action be brought under the Tucker Act in the United States Court of
Federal Claims on the grounds that it is a claim for “liquidated or
unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort”?185
Returning to the Indian Trust cases, we find the closest and most
intriguing analogy. Since the early 1980s, the Supreme Court has decided a
number of cases in which Native American tribes have sued the United
States for damages for improper management of tribal property including
timber lands and coal resources. In the leading case of Mitchell II, the Court
traced the history of the U.S. role as custodian of tribal lands back into the
19th century, finding that the relationship was not merely a “naked trust”
established by the Allotment Act of 1887 to prevent alienation and did not
impose fiduciary duties, as was held in Mitchell I,186 but rather through a variety of subsequent statutes and regulations, established comprehensive
federal control over the Native American lands.187 With this comprehensive
control, the Court held, came fiduciary duties, duties that had been breached
in the mismanagement of the timber resources.188 Similarly, when, pursuant
to statute, the United States took full control of Fort Apache, used the Fort
for the government’s own purposes, and neglected it, the Court held that, in
doing so, the United States took on a trustee’s duty to preserve and maintain
the trust corpus, a duty that it had breached.189
But the Navajo coal-leasing cases make clear that the level of
government involvement must be comprehensive. In the first Navajo Nation
case,190 the Supreme Court held that the Secretary of the Interior’s obligation
to approve mineral leases did not impose fiduciary duties in doing so, at least
when the tribe and the coal company had negotiated terms.191 When the
Navajo Nation case returned to the Supreme Court after remand, the Court
was even sharper in rejecting the claim:
The Federal Government’s liability cannot be premised on control
alone. The text of the Indian Tucker Act makes clear that only claims

185. Although we often think of the corporation as a nexus of contracting and of fiduciary
duties through a contractual framework, this is not a sufficient basis to claim that a breach-offiduciary-duty claim is a breach of an implicit contract. Under the Tucker Act, “implicit contracts”
refers to “implied in fact” contracts (i.e., actual contracts implied from the conduct of the parties in
light of the circumstances surrounding their interaction) and not “implied in law” contracts. United
States v. Mitchell (Mitchell II), 463 U.S. 206, 218 (1983). Because it is difficult if not impossible to
conceptualize this case as a breach-of-contract action, the scope of United States v. Winstar, 518
U.S. 839, 909 (1996), and its implications for the limits of sovereign immunity under the Tucker
Act, do not arise.
186. United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell I), 445 U.S. 535, 542 (1980).
187. Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 228.
188. Id. at 211.
189. United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 471 (2003).
190. United States v. Navajo Nation (Navajo Nation I), 537 U.S. 488 (2003).
191. Id. at 506–08.
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arising under “the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States, or
Executive orders of the President” are cognizable (unless the claim
could be brought by a non-Indian plaintiff under the ordinary Tucker
Act). . . . In Navajo I we reiterated that the analysis must begin with
“specific rights-creating or duty-imposing statutory or regulatory
prescriptions.” . . . If a plaintiff identifies such a prescription, and if
that prescription bears the hallmarks of a “conventional fiduciary
relationship,” . . . then trust principles (including any such principles
premised on “control”) could play a role in “inferring that the trust
obligation [is] enforceable by damages” . . . . But that must be the
second step of the analysis, not (as the Federal Circuit made it) the
starting point.192
Thus, though under the Indian Trust cases the United States can become
a fiduciary and damages can be awarded for breaches of that duty, there is a
high bar.
Does exercising control through the power conveyed by a controlling
equity stake cause the United States to take on the fiduciary duties of a controlling shareholder, as under Delaware law? The law is not clear. Navajo
Nation II, quoted above, holds that control alone is not enough. Rather, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that the duty must be based in the
Constitution or a statutory enactment. As the court held in Mitchell II, and
subsequently reiterated in Navajo Nation II, quoted above:
[T]he Tucker Act “‘does not create any substantive right enforceable
against the United States for money damages.’” . . . A substantive
right must be found in some other source of law, such as “the
Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an
executive department.” . . .
Not every claim invoking the
Constitution, a federal statute, or a regulation is cognizable under the
Tucker Act. The claim must be one for money damages against the
United States, . . . and the claimant must demonstrate that the source
of substantive law he relies upon “‘can fairly be interpreted as
mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damage
sustained.’”193
In our hypo, there is hardly the same sort of comprehensive statutory
framework present in Mitchell II. Indeed, the only statutory basis seems to
be the EESA, which provided the Treasury with authority to buy troubled
assets in financial institutions. Moreover, Mitchell II seems to suggest that
the basis must be either the U.S. Constitution or a federal statute: because it
is a waiver of federal sovereign immunity that is at stake, state statutes or

192. United States v. Navajo Nation (Navajo Nation II), 129 S. Ct. 1547, 1558 (2009) (citations
omitted).
193. Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 216–17 (citations omitted).
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common law are an insufficient basis.194 The Treasury might therefore avoid
Mitchell II and White Mountain Apache Tribe on the grounds that there is no
adequate federal statutory basis on which to ground a claimed fiduciary duty.
But that may be too quick. The Indian Trust cases interpret the part of
the Tucker Act that is explicitly limited to claims founded “upon the
Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive
department.”195 But the (regular) Tucker Act also waives immunity with
respect to any claim “founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of
Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express
or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated
damages in cases not sounding in tort.”196 Can one argue that, under that
final clause, the acquisition of shares of a Delaware corporation gives rise to
liability for damages because, in acquiring shares, the United States acquires
control by virtue of the network of statutory and common law provisions that
are Delaware corporate law (e.g., the right to elect directors under
sections 212, 216, etc.), power that brings with it fiduciary duties? One
might argue that this situation is much closer to Mitchell II and
White Mountain Apache Tribe, in which the Supreme Court suggested that
governmental fiduciary duties can arise when the government assumes control over property belonging to Indians. Thus, in Mitchell II, the Court
stated,
Moreover, a fiduciary relationship necessarily arises when the
Government assumes such elaborate control over forests and property
belonging to Indians. All of the necessary elements of a common-law
trust are present: a trustee (the United States), a beneficiary (the Indian
allottees), and a trust corpus (Indian timber, lands, and funds).
“[W]here the Federal Government takes on or has control or
supervision over tribal monies or properties, the fiduciary relationship
normally exists with respect to such monies or properties (unless
Congress has provided otherwise) even though nothing is said
expressly in the authorizing or underlying statute (or other
fundamental document) about a trust fund, or a trust or fiduciary
connection.”197
Later, in White Mountain Apache Tribe, the Court sounded the same
themes, allowing actual control to substitute for absent statutory language:
As to the property subject to the Government’s actual use, then, the
United States has not merely exercised daily supervision but has
enjoyed daily occupation, and so has obtained control at least as
194. See id. at 216–18 (referring exclusively to Tucker Act claims against the United States
“founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive
department”).
195. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2006); see also, e.g., Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 216–18.
196. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (emphasis added).
197. Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 225 (alteration in original) (citation and footnote omitted).
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plenary as its authority over the timber in Mitchell II. While it is true
that the 1960 Act does not, like the statutes cited in that case,
expressly subject the Government to duties of management and
conservation, the fact that the property occupied by the United States
is expressly subject to a trust supports a fair inference that an
obligation to preserve the property improvements was incumbent on
the United States as trustee. This is so because elementary trust law,
after all, confirms the commonsense assumption that a fiduciary
actually administering trust property may not allow it to fall into ruin
on his watch. “One of the fundamental common-law duties of a trustee
is to preserve and maintain trust assets.” . . . Given this duty on the
part of the trustee to preserve corpus, “it naturally follows that the
Government should be liable in damages for the breach of its fiduciary
duties.”198
In Navajo Nation II, the Supreme Court distinguished Mitchell II,
without overruling it, on the grounds that in Mitchell II, there was
a series of statutes and regulations that gave the Federal Government
“full responsibility to manage Indian resources and land for the benefit
of the Indians.” . . . Title 25 U.S.C. § 406(a) permitted Indians to sell
timber with the consent of the Secretary of the Interior, but directed
the Secretary to base his decisions on “a consideration of the needs
and best interests of the Indian owner and his heirs” and enumerated
specific factors to guide that decisionmaking. We understood that
statute—in combination with several other provisions and the
applicable regulations—to create a fiduciary duty with respect to
Indian timber.199
Although one clearly cannot argue that there is a similarly
comprehensive web of federal statutes that creates obligations on the federal
government, one might argue that when the Treasury took a controlling interest in DMAC pursuant to authority granted by the EESA and then
exercised that control pursuant to the General Corporation Law of Delaware
to benefit another firm in its portfolio at the expense of DMAC, it took on the
fiduciary duties of a controlling shareholder under Delaware law, and “it
naturally follows that the Government should be liable in damages for the
breach of its fiduciary duties.”200 Indeed, while the case law seems clear that
the common law of trusts (or of fiduciary duties) will not be sufficient to
ground the Treasury’s obligation, the common law could be used to fill out
the details of that obligation, especially, as here, when fiduciary duties are an

198. United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 475–76 (2003) (citations
omitted).
199. United States v. Navajo Nation (Navajo Nation II), 129 S. Ct. 1547, 1553–54 (2009)
(citations omitted).
200. Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 226.
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intrinsic part of the (nonfederal) statutory framework that creates the
governmental power at issue.
Although this seems to be a promising direction, such a claim would
clearly be a step beyond current case law even if not precluded by the current
Supreme Court jurisprudence. It is, of course, unclear whether a federal
court would choose to take that step, or whether if it did, it would be affirmed
on appeal. More to the point, fiduciary-duty law hardly provides any sort of
robust protection that could plausibly substitute for Delaware’s fiduciaryduty jurisprudence. Again, we are driven to the view that if we are
concerned about the government’s use of its controlling position, the Tucker
Act theories are hardly reassuring.201
d. Claims Under the APA.—A third basis for challenging the
Treasury’s actions at DMAC is the APA. Section 702 of the APA explicitly
waives sovereign immunity for actions against the United States so long as
those actions do not seek money damages:202
A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely
affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a
relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof. An action in a
court of the United States seeking relief other than money damages
and stating a claim that an agency or an officer or employee thereof
acted or failed to act in an official capacity or under color of legal
authority shall not be dismissed nor relief therein be denied on the
ground that it is against the United States or that the United States is
an indispensable party. The United States may be named as a
defendant in any such action, and a judgment or decree may be
entered against the United States . . . .203
Under the APA,204 actions can be brought in federal district court
against the United States to
hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions
found to be—

201. The Tucker Act also provides a cause of action to challenge a taking in violation of the
Fifth Amendment. Although the opening hypothetical does not present a takings claim, with a little
creativity one could add one (e.g., the Treasury decides to freeze out minority shareholders without
compensation). While a takings claim could be a basis for challenging such an action, it does not
provide a regulatory structure that parallels Delaware’s fiduciary-duty law. For a brief summary of
the applicable law, see SISK, supra note 127, § 4.09(b).
202. Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879 (1988), blurred this line, but even under Bowen,
damages for breach of fiduciary duty would be excluded. Id. at 899–900.
203. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006).
204. Although codified in the APA, this waiver applies more broadly and includes actions to
enjoin violations of constitutional rights. In our case, because the Tucker Act permits actions for
damages when takings without compensation are involved, this aspect of § 702 is marginal to our
purposes.
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(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or
immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or
short of statutory right;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to
sections 556 and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the
record of an agency hearing provided by statute; or
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are
subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court.205
The question, then, is whether our plaintiff, a minority shareholder in
DMAC, can bring an action under § 706 to enjoin the decision that requires
DMAC to provide financing to GM and its dealers and its customers on
preferential terms.
Fitting the hypo into administrative law categories is not easy.
Consider, first, a conceptually easier issue that arises out of the Treasury’s
decision to invest TARP funds in Chrysler and GM. As noted above, these
investments raise two questions. First, does a troubled auto company fall
within the statutory definition of a “financial institution”? Second, does equity in new GM or new Chrysler fall within the definition of “troubled
asset”? Both of these are questions of statutory interpretation and fit comfortably within the basic framework of administrative law.206 Under
Chevron,207 the Treasury could certainly argue that Congress did not address
the precise question at issue in the EESA, and, in any event, any congressional intent was certainly not unambiguously clear.208 Given this and
moving on to the classic second step of Chevron,209 the Treasury might argue
that its interpretations of the definitions of “troubled asset” and “financial
institution” were both “permissible” ones and thus deserve deference.
But now contrast these typical questions of administrative law with our
hypo in which the Treasury leans on DMAC to help DM. Note, first, that the

205. 5 U.S.C. § 706.
206. I leave to the side the question of who would have standing. In the Chrysler bankruptcy
proceeding, the Southern District of New York Bankruptcy Court held that secured-debt holders did
not have standing to challenge the investment because they benefited from it. In re Chrysler LLC,
405 B.R. 79, 83 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
207. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
208. See id. at 842–43 (“First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to
the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the
court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”).
209. See id. at 843 (“[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the
question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute.”).
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action at issue is a rather different action than the decision to invest TARP
funds in GM or Chrysler: it is not a normal exercise of agency authority. The
Treasury is acting in the private sector, not in government forums, and using
its shareholding to do so. It is not promulgating rules, nor distributing public
funds, nor adjudicating matters.
Consider whether Chevron deference will apply. Here, the governing
statute—in this case the EESA—offers no guidance for how the Treasury is
to manage the portfolio. Although the EESA is clear that the Treasury has
power to manage the portfolio—and so managing it is hardly ultra vires—it
provides no guidance, no standards, no criteria, and only the most general
goals:
SEC. 2. PURPOSES.
The purposes of this Act are—
(1) to immediately provide authority and facilities that the
Secretary of the Treasury can use to restore liquidity and stability
to the financial system of the United States; and
(2) to ensure that such authority and such facilities are used in a
manner that—
(A) protects home values, college funds, retirement
accounts, and life savings;
(B) preserves home ownership and promotes jobs and
economic growth;
(C) maximizes overall returns to the taxpayers of the United
States; and
(D) provides public accountability for the exercise of such
authority.210
Moreover, although the EESA grants the Treasury the authority to
exercise any rights associated with acquired assets and to manage the
portfolio,211 no guidance is provided beyond the General Purpose Clause with
regard to how and for what purpose. And this is hardly accidental: it is
crystal clear that when the EESA was debated and eventually enacted,
Congress was not thinking about direct investments in equity, much less
direct and controlling equity investments in auto companies.
Further, in managing the assets, the Treasury has not explicitly
interpreted the EESA or any other statute, so there is no agency interpretation
of its own statute to which Chevron deference could apply. While one could
argue with regard to the investments in GM and Chrysler themselves that the
Treasury’s act of investing can be understood to be an implicit interpretation
of the statutory definitions, that same argument is much harder to make with

210. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 2, 122
Stat. 3765, 3766 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5201).
211. Id. § 106, 122 Stat. at 3773 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5216).
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regard to the hypo because there is so little in the statute that pertains to the
management of equity investments.
Considered as a policy judgment, would the Treasury’s decision to lean
on DMAC to help DM be invalid as “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law” in violation of
§ 706(2)(A)?212 To the extent that this is another way of saying that agency
action must be “reasonable,” it begs the question of the relevant standard of
reasonableness. Likewise, the final phrase—“or otherwise not in accordance
with the law”—is suggestive without being clear on which laws it refers to.
The hypo arises because the federal government acts in the private
setting without explicitly taking on the obligations of that position (which
would incorporate Delaware law norms) or explicitly opting out through
preemptive legislation. One approach to applying § 706 in this context
would be to argue that, in corporate law as elsewhere, state law applies unless legitimately preempted by federal law, and thus, the Treasury is bound
by the same state law limits as any other controlling shareholder. To the
extent, then, that the Treasury’s actions are inconsistent with Delaware
corporate law—as they clearly would be—they are “not in accordance with
law” and thus invalid under § 706.
The counterargument, of course, draws on § 701(a)(2), which precludes
judicial review when “agency action is committed to agency discretion by
law.”213 As the Supreme Court held in the Overton Park case,214 the exception for action committed to agency discretion is a “very narrow
exception. . . . The legislative history of the APA indicates that it is applicable in those rare instances where ‘statutes are drawn in such broad terms that
in a given case there is no law to apply.’”215 The “no law to apply” language
can be understood as itself compelling evidence that a decision has been left
to agency discretion or as merely one piece of whether a particular subject
has been “committed to agency discretion.”216 In Heckler v. Chaney,217 the
Supreme Court interpreted the provision as applying when “the statute is
drawn so that a court would have no meaningful standard against which to
judge the agency’s exercise of discretion.”218
Whether one gives wide or narrow effect to a statute containing “no law
to apply,” it would not seem to provide a very strong argument in the context
of the hypo. While it is true that the EESA provides no guidance in how the
Treasury is to exercise its rights as a holder of “troubled assets,” there is no
212. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006).
213. Id. § 701(a)(2).
214. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
215. Id. at 410 (quoting S. REP. NO. 79-752, at 26 (1945)).
216. STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 791 (6th
ed. 2006).
217. 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
218. Id. at 830.
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evidence that Congress expected the Treasury to acquire equity securities and
thus no evidence at all that Congress committed the management of conflicts
of interest created by control-equity positions to agency discretion.
We see, yet again, how hard it is to insert the substance of corporate
law’s fiduciary-duty analysis into a public law framework.
e. Claims Under the Freedom of Information Act.—In yet another
example of how everything changes when the government is the controlling
shareholder, it is worth noting that the definition of “agency” for the
purposes of the Freedom of Information Act219 (FOIA) includes a
“[g]overnment controlled corporation.”220 Indeed, the effect of FOIA may go
even further. On President Obama’s first day in office, he issued a
Memorandum on the Freedom of Information Act directing his incoming
attorney general to reestablish a presumption in favor of disclosure of government records as well as ordering agencies to take “affirmative steps to
make information public. They should not wait for specific requests from the
public. All agencies should use modern technology to inform citizens about
what is known and done by their Government.”221
Take new GM, the successor to GM, of which the government still
owns 26%. What information can be secured pursuant to FOIA that is not
already available under either SEC disclosure regulations or sections 219 and
220 of Delaware General Corporation Law?222
Particularly relevant for these purposes is the exclusion of “inter-agency
or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law
to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency.”223 Although
this limits the scope of material that can be secured under FOIA, it leaves
undisturbed the advantages in timing: the FOIA will be most useful in gathering information prior to filing a complaint. Sections 219 and 220 of
Delaware law are sharply limited in what can be secured,224 while the FOIA

219. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
220. Id. § 552(f)(1).
221. Memorandum on the Freedom of Information Act, 2009 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 9 (Jan.
21, 2009).
222. New GM is a Delaware corporation. See First Amendment to Amended and Restated
Master Sale and Purchase Agreement (June 30, 2009), available at http://www.nclc.org/
autobankruptcies/AmendmenttoGMARMSPA.pdf.
223. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5).
224. See, e.g., Sec. First Corp. v. U.S. Die Casting & Dev. Co., 687 A.2d 563, 570 (Del. 1997)
(“A Section 220 proceeding should result in an order circumscribed with rifled precision.”);
Rainbow Navigation, Inc. v. Pan Ocean Navigation, Inc., 535 A.2d 1357, 1360 (Del. 1987)
(“[E]stablishing oneself as a stockholder of record [under Section 219] is a mandatory condition
precedent to the right to make a demand for inspection . . . .”).
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exception provides support for a strong presumption in favor of being able to
get all material that would be available by law to a party in litigation.225
E. An Alternative Strategy: Leaving the U.S. Government Out of the Suit
So far, we have assumed as inevitable that the lawsuit will end up either
in federal district court or the Court of Federal Claims. After the above
analysis, one might conclude that trying to sue the federal government as a
controlling shareholder is too hard to be worthwhile. Is there an alternative
approach that dispenses with the federal government that would allow the
cause of action to remain in the Delaware Court of Chancery to be
adjudicated under Delaware law?
In a related article, we have argued that there are credible claims that
could be brought against the directors under Delaware law.226 But this then
raises subsequent and important questions: Should Delaware courts want
such a case? Should plaintiffs want to bring such a case in Delaware? And,
finally, how should Delaware avoid a case, should it decide that the case puts
Delaware in an impossible position?
In our related article, we argue that the plausible claims against the
directors hold the potential to threaten Delaware’s place in the corporate law
landscape.227 In such a case, the key questions would be (1) how the
Treasury behaved, (2) would the case involve depositions of top Treasury
officials, and (3) were a Delaware court to enjoin the transaction, would this
risk provoking a confrontation with Washington? In light of Delaware’s
vulnerable position, plaintiffs would be wise to avoid a Delaware forum, and
Delaware courts, were such a claim filed, should avoid adjudicating such
claims if they can do so.
How, then, might Delaware dodge the bullet? We argue that Delaware
Chancery Court Rule 19, the Delaware parallel to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 19, the “indispensable party” rule, provides sufficient discretion to
avoid a confrontation. By using the discretion provided by this rule of
procedure, Delaware could “duck” the question without significantly
compromising Delaware corporate law doctrine, the parties’ ability to resolve
the dispute, or Delaware’s place in the corporate law landscape.
F. Conclusion
For a litigator, this is a pretty depressing Part. The bottom line is that
when the Treasury is the controlling shareholder, the legal basis for challenging conduct that would normally constitute a clear breach of the duty of

225. For a fuller treatment of the law governing the scope of this exception, see RICHARD J.
PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 5.11 (5th ed. 2010).
226. Kahan & Rock, supra note 111, at 410.
227. Id. at 427–28.

2011]

When the Government Is the Controlling Shareholder

1347

loyalty or care is very weak. GM’s S-1 concisely and conclusorily takes an
even more negative view when, after explaining that shareholders will not
have any redress under the federal securities laws, it concludes,
Further, any attempt to assert a claim against the UST or any of its
officers, agents or employees alleging any other complaint, including
as a result of any future action by the UST as a stockholder of the
Company, would also likely be barred under sovereign immunity
unless specifically permitted by act of Congress.228
Although the claims against the directors or to enjoin the transaction are
stronger, they put Delaware into a no-win situation, which Delaware would
be well-advised to avoid. It may be that a creative and courageous judge will
manage within the confines of existing law to enjoin or sanction the conduct
in the opening hypothetical, but when one compares the legal structure described above to the robust protections of noncontrolling shareholders in the
fully private context, there is not much room for optimism.
For transactional lawyers, the reaction may be even stronger. Even if
the legal basis could be strengthened, this seems like a crazy way to handle
the conflicts of interest created by government ownership of equity stakes in
private companies. Is there a better way to set things up so these impossible
problems do not arise? If there is not, then we ought to end the experiment
as quickly as possible.
IV. Structuring Government Ownership Ex Ante
Government ownership is a political decision. How involved should the
state be in private industry? To what extent should the government make
day-to-day business decisions or set long-term strategy? Is government
ownership a long-term arrangement or a short-term fix? For whom should a
government-controlled firm be managed? Among countries and over time,
one observes a huge variation in attitudes toward, and structures of,
government ownership.
Implicit in the preceding Parts is the assumption that government use of
its controlling interest in one portfolio company to aid another or to influence
business strategy is problematic. But that, of course, assumes a particular
political choice about the appropriate role of government that is obviously
contestable.
The legal structure of government ownership—how the shares are held;
whether ownership is complete, controlling, or minority; the role of courts;
etc.—is important in a number of ways.
First, it is part of the way in which political choices are implemented—
not the whole story, to be sure, but an important piece.

228. General Motors Co., Amendment No. 9 (Form S-1), at 35 (Nov. 17, 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1467858/000119312510262471/ds1a.htm#rom45833_2.
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Second, the legal structure, which itself is a product of fundamental
political choices, provides a window into what those choices have been.
Third, existing legal “technology” sets a limit on political choices: we
cannot choose what we cannot implement.
In this Part, we examine a variety of contemporary examples of how
government ownership has been structured. In thinking through these questions of organizational design, there are a variety of dimensions—design
choices, if you will—to keep in mind:


What is the goal of government ownership? Profit?
Preserving national champions? Consumer welfare?



What is the term of governmental involvement? Short term? Long
term? Indefinite?



To what extent are firm decisions insulated from political influence?

Security?



How are decision makers held accountable? Through political
mechanisms? Legal mechanisms? Not at all?
Given the historical variety of government involvement, a striking
feature of the current arrangements is the widespread acceptance of a number
of features, at least at the rhetorical level: first, that the goal of government
involvement is to preserve or create firms that can thrive in competitive markets without continuing government support; second, that government
involvement should be a short-term intervention that is justified by extraordinary circumstances; and third, that business decisions should be insulated
from government influence.
Consider, in this regard, the Obama Administration’s articulated
principles for managing ownership interests in private firms, including its
then-61% ownership stake in the new GM:


“The government has no desire to own equity stakes in companies
any longer than necessary, and will seek to dispose of its ownership
interests as soon as practicable.”



“In exceptional cases where the U.S. government feels it is necessary
to respond to a company’s request for substantial assistance, the
government will reserve the right to set upfront conditions to protect
taxpayers, promote financial stability and encourage growth.”



“After any up-front conditions are in place, the government will
protect the taxpayers’ investment by managing its ownership stake in
a hands-off, commercial manner.”
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“As a common shareholder, the government will only vote on core
governance issues, including the selection of a company’s board of
directors and major corporate events or transactions.”229
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises
takes a similarly “liberal” approach.230
Although one might doubt the sincerity of some of these utterances, the
desire of the U.S. government to exit government ownership seems genuine.
Substantial steps have been taken to reduce government ownership of
Citigroup, GM, and AIG (although with the perverse effect of increasing it,
at least temporarily, to 92.1%). The articulated goals of the Obama
Administration are a version of classic liberal political economy. If we take
this (perhaps merely rhetorical) consensus as given, the design analysis
within these bounds becomes more tractable and more interesting. The key
questions become a matter of means: Which legal structures for government
intervention are more likely to achieve the stipulated goals? As we examine
the different structures of government ownership, we will see a variety of
approaches.
A. U.S. Models
In the extreme conditions of 2008 and 2009 with the ad hoc and rushed
responses to the unfolding crisis described above, many of the U.S.
Treasury’s investments in private corporations were made directly with no
binding governance structure. As a result, the U.S. Treasury directly holds
the stakes in GM, Chrysler, GMAC, Citigroup, Fannie Mae, and Freddie
Mac. This direct-ownership regime, as we discussed earlier, exposed GM
and Chrysler to direct lobbying by politicians over GM and Chrysler decisions to close distribution facilities and dealerships in key congressional
districts. As such, “direct ownership” provides the problematic baseline
against which alternative ownership structures should be measured.
1. Chrysler 1.0.—The first Chrysler bailout was in late 1979 and early
1980 and was structured as a debt-guarantee program rather than a direct injection of capital. Under the Chrysler Corporation Loan Guarantee Act of
1979,231 the U.S. government provided up to a maximum of $1.5 billion in
loan guarantees. The structure was somewhat different from what we ob229. Press Release, White House, Obama Administration Auto Restructuring Initiative: General
Motors Restructuring (May 31, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/fact-sheetobama-administration-auto-restructuring-initiative-general-motors.
230. OECD, OECD GUIDELINES ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF STATE-OWNED
ENTERPRISES (2005), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/46/51/34803211.pdf. Because the
OECD guidelines are long on goals and short on recommended institutional arrangements, the
guidelines do not represent an independent model for structuring government ownership.
231. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1861–1875 (1982).
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serve today, partially explained by the fact that although the country was in a
recession, debt and equity markets were functioning. The first Chrysler
bailout had several important features.
First, a Chrysler Corporation Loan Guarantee Board was established,
comprised of the Secretary of the Treasury, the Chair of the Federal Reserve,
and the Comptroller General, with the Secretaries of Labor and
Transportation as ex officio, nonvoting members.232
Second, the board had authority to provide loan guarantees “on such
terms and conditions as it deemed appropriate” but only if the board
determined that Chrysler had met a variety of conditions, including an
energy-savings plan, a satisfactory operating plan, and a financing plan that
would raise equivalent amounts of nonfederally guaranteed debt.233
Loan guarantees could be issued under the Act only if the board
determined that credit was not otherwise available on reasonable terms and
that there was reasonable assurance that Chrysler would pay the money back.
Chrysler was charged a guarantee fee (of not less than .5% per year), and the
board was expected “to the maximum extent feasible [to] ensure that the
Government is compensated for the risk assumed in making guarantees,”
including “enter[ing] into contracts under which the Government, contingent
upon the financial success of the Corporation, would participate in the gains
of the Corporation or its security holders.”234 The U.S. government received
14.4 million warrants to purchase Chrysler stock at $13 per share until
1990.235 In 1983, the U.S. government auctioned these warrants, and
Chrysler purchased them for $311 million.236
Finally, a variety of creditor protective covenants were imposed,
including veto rights over unapproved sales of assets, large contracts
(including future collective-bargaining agreements), and a limitation on
dividends.237 In addition, no guarantees could be issued after December 31,
1983,238 and all guarantees expired and all loans had to be repaid before
December 31, 1990.239
The most striking difference between the first Chrysler bailout and the
current bailout is the contrast between the debt model used in the 1970s and
the private-equity model used this time around. Although debt holders certainly are able to control firms in certain circumstances, the private-equity
model typically puts control at its center. In choosing the private-equity
232.
233.
234.
235.

Id. § 1862.
Id. § 1863.
Id. § 1864(d).
JAMES M. BICKLEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 40005, CHRYSLER CORPORATION LOAN
GUARANTEE ACT OF 1979: BACKGROUND, PROVISIONS AND COST 5 (2008).
236. Id.
237. 15 U.S.C. § 1870.
238. Id. § 1875.
239. Id. § 1868.
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model and relying on modifications of Simpson Thacher’s private-equity
documents, the current intervention was tilted, from the outset, toward
control.
2. The AIG Structure: An Explicit Trust.—On September 16, 2008, the
Federal Reserve rescued AIG by pledging $85 billion.240 As part of the
package, stated in the Federal Reserve’s press release, “The U.S. government
will receive a 79.9 percent equity interest in AIG and has the right to veto the
payment of dividends to common and preferred shareholders.”241 On
October 8, 2008, as AIG continued to spiral downward, the Federal Reserve
pledged another $37.8 billion.242 On November 10, 2008, additional funds
were invested through TARP.243
The equity stake, noted in the initial press release, was not issued until
March 2009. When the stock was ultimately issued on March 4, 2009, as
Series C Preferred Stock, it represented 77.9% of the voting power.244 It was
issued to a trust established for the sole benefit of the Treasury.
The terms of the stock issuance and the trust are both interesting. As to
the stock, Series C Preferred Stock, in addition to carrying 77.9% of the
votes and an equivalent right to dividends, it also requires that “AIG and
AIG’s Board of Directors are obligated to work in good faith with the Trust
to ensure that AIG’s corporate governance arrangements are satisfactory to
the Trust.”245
The stock was issued to the “AIG Credit Facility Trust,” which was
established by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY). In the
trust agreement, there is an explicit recognition of the potential conflicts of
interests that can arise from the stock ownership: “WHEREAS, to avoid any
possible conflict with its supervisory and monetary policy functions, the
FRBNY does not intend to exercise any discretion or control over the voting
and consent rights associated with the Trust Stock.”246
In addition, there is also a recognition of the dangers of excessive
interference:
WHEREAS, the FRBNY anticipates that the Trustees will leave the
day-to-day management of the Company to the persons charged with

240. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., supra note 12.
241. Id.
242. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Oct. 8, 2008), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/other/20081008a.htm.
243. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Nov. 10, 2008), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/other/20081110a.htm.
244. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (Mar. 2, 2009). The government stake
was reduced to approximately 77.9% from the original 79.9% because of warrants for
approximately 2% that were issued to the Treasury in November 2008. Id. at 10–11.
245. Id.
246. AIG Credit Facility Trust Agreement, supra note 182, at 2.
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such management, and will limit their involvement in the corporate
governance of the Company to the exercise of the rights set forth in
this Trust Agreement.247
In the operative provisions of the Trust, the trustees, appointed by the
FRBNY in consultation with the Treasury, are given the power to exercise all
shareholder rights, including rights to vote on charter amendments, bylaw
amendments, election of directors, removal of directors, and anything else.248
Although given complete discretion, the FRBNY included provisions
expressing its views on the proper goals of the Trust:
In exercising their discretion hereunder with respect to the Trust
Stock, the Trustees are advised that it is the FRBNY’s view that
(x) maximizing the Company’s ability to honor its commitments to,
and repay all amounts owed to, the FRBNY or the Treasury
Department and (y) the Company being managed in a manner that will
not disrupt financial market conditions, are both consistent with
maximizing the value of the Trust Stock.249
At the same time, there are a few restrictions built in. The Trustees may
not themselves serve as directors250 nor vote to elect as directors anyone who
is or has recently been an employee of the FRBNY or the Treasury.251 The
Trustees may not be officers or employees of the FRBNY, the Treasury, or
AIG, or be the parent, spouse, or child of anyone who is.252
The standard of care imposed on the trustees is extremely capacious:
A Trustee shall have no liability hereunder for any action taken or
refrained from or suffered by such Trustee, provided that such Trustee
(i) acted in good faith in a manner the Trustee reasonably believed to
be in accordance with the provisions of this Trust Agreement and in or
not opposed to the best interests of the Treasury and (ii) had no
reasonable cause to believe his or her conduct was unlawful . . . .253
The initial and, at the time of this writing, only trustees of the AIG trust
are Jill Considine, Chester Feldberg, and Douglas Foshee.254 Considine formerly was the Chair and CEO of the Depository Trust & Clearing
Corporation and currently serves as a director of the Interpublic Group of

247. Id.
248. Id. § 2.04.
249. Id. § 2.04(d).
250. Id. § 2.04(f).
251. Id. § 2.04(e).
252. Id. § 3.01.
253. Id. § 3.03(a).
254. Who Are the Trustees?, INFO. ABOUT THE AIG TRS., http://www.aigcreditfacilitytrust.
com/Home_1121_238661.html.
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Companies and Ambac Financial Group Inc.255 Chester Feldberg was Chair
of Barclays Americas from 2000 to 2008 after having been executive vice
president in charge of bank supervision at the New York Federal Reserve.256
Douglas Foshee is president and CEO of El Paso Corporation, a publicly held
gas-pipeline company, and previously worked at Halliburton.257
How well does this approach protect against the temptations identified
above? AIG, from the outset, has fought to run its business “on a
commercial basis.” The initial bonus scandal exposed it to political
condemnation and forced changes in compensation policies prospectively.
Indeed, compensation has been such a salient issue that the current CEO,
Robert Benmosche, reportedly threatened to resign if he was not permitted to
pay key employees market rates.258 The continuing involvement of Ken
Feinberg, the compensation czar with authority over compensation in firms
that have received TARP funding, complicated the management tasks and
interfered with running the business “on a commercial basis,” at least if this
refers to how non-TARP financial institutions are managed.
As noted above, the trust is in the process of being dissolved, with the
Treasury resuming direct ownership as a preliminary step to selling its
shares.
3. Another U.S. Model: Limited Voting and Predetermined Exit at
Citigroup.—The Treasury owned as much as 34% of Citigroup as a result of
exchanging the preferred stock it purchased with TARP funds for common
stock. As part of that exchange offer, the Treasury agreed to two interesting
provisions. First, it limited its voting rights slightly by agreeing to vote its
shares in the same proportions as other common stockholders, except with
respect to major decisions—including election or removal of directors,
amendments to the charter, and any sale of the company.259 Second, the
Treasury committed to disposing of the stock within ten years.260

255. Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Statement Regarding Establishment of the AIG
Credit Facility Trust: Trustees’ CVs (Jan. 16, 2009), http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/
markets/2009/an090116.pdf.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Serena Ng et al., Benmosche ‘Committed’ to AIG, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 2009, at C1.
259. An amendment to Citigroup’s S-4 filing contains this provision:
Voting of Common Stock. The U.S. Treasury has agreed that it will vote all of its
Common Stock in the same proportion as all other shares of Common Stock are voted,
with respect to each matter on which holders of Common Stock are entitled to vote or
consent other than with respect to the following matters: (i) the election and removal of
directors, (ii) the approval of any merger, consolidation, statutory share exchange or
similar transaction that requires the approval of Citigroup’s stockholders, (iii) the
approval of a sale of all or substantially all of the assets or property of Citigroup,
(iv) the approval of a dissolution of Citigroup, (v) the approval of any issuance of
securities of Citigroup on which holders of Citigroup’s Common Stock are entitled to
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How well has this worked out for the Treasury or for Citigroup? It is
hard to say. Like other TARP banks, Citigroup sought to free itself from restrictions associated with government involvement (mainly, one thinks, those
having to do with compensation) by paying back the TARP investments.261
At the same time, the Treasury was keen to sell its shares so that it could
show a profit on its TARP investments. With the sale of the final block of
Citigroup stock and the associated warrants at the end of 2010, the Treasury
no longer has an equity stake. The real concern should be whether Citigroup,
to avoid the TARP restrictions on executive compensation, has repaid the
TARP funds before it was strong enough to do so.
B. U.K. Financial Investments Limited
In the fall of 2008, as AIG, Lehman, and other U.S. financial
institutions were collapsing, so too were major institutions in the United
Kingdom. With government investments or bailouts of, inter alia, Royal
Bank of Scotland (RBS), Lloyds, Northern Rock, and Bradford & Bingley,
the U.K. government found itself with significant and sometimes controlling
equity stakes. In response, U.K. Financial Investments Limited (UKFI) was
set up on November 3, 2008, to manage those investments.262
UKFI was set up as a company under the Companies Act with the U.K.
Treasury as the sole shareholder. A key stated goal of the structure was to
adopt “[r]obust institutional arrangements for keeping UKFI at arm’s-length
from Government, centred on the creation of a heavyweight UKFI board
which will take all major decisions relating to UKFI’s business and its management of the investments.”263 The board included, as acting chair, Glen
Moreno, who is chairman of Pearson plc, previously served as CEO of
Fidelity International, and worked for Citigroup in a variety of senior
positions.264 The CEO was John Kingman, who previously “was Second
Permanent Secretary to the Treasury, where he was responsible for oversight
vote and (vi) the approval of any amendment to the charter or bylaws of Citigroup on
which holders of Common Stock are entitled to vote.
Citigroup, Inc., Amendment No. 5 (Form S-4), at 75–76 (July 17, 2009).
260. Another filing by Citigroup in connection with this transaction contains this provision:
Mandatory Sale Date. If the U.S. Treasury owns any Common Stock or warrants
convertible into such Common Stock on the tenth anniversary of the closing date of
the Exchange Offers, then the U.S. Treasury agrees to use reasonable efforts to
transfer to non-governmental entities on an annual basis at least 20% of the aggregate
number of such shares owned by the U.S. Treasury until all of such shares are
transferred.
Id. at 76.
261. Smith, Lucchetti & Crittenden, supra note 93.
262. U.K. FIN. INVS. LTD., AN INTRODUCTION: WHO WE ARE, WHAT WE DO, AND THE
FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT THAT GOVERNS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN UKFI AND HM
TREASURY 1 (2009), available at http://www.ukfi.co.uk/releases/UKFI%20Introduction.pdf.
263. Id. at 11.
264. Id. at 3.
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and control of some £600 billion of public spending annually.”265 The remainder of the board included an impressive group of directors with
experience in business and government, a mix that was clearly intentional.
The “Framework Document” established the relationship between the
Treasury and UKFI and provided guidelines to UKFI in managing the portfolio of Treasury shareholdings. It opens with the Treasury’s overarching
objective, namely, to dispose of the investments as soon as possible and, in
the meantime, to preserve their value:
The Company should, in compliance with the Investment Mandate
described in Section 4, develop and execute an investment strategy for
disposing of the Investments in an orderly and active way through
sale, redemption, buy-back or other means within the context of an
overarching objective of protecting and creating value for the taxpayer
as shareholder, paying due regard to the maintenance of financial
stability and to acting in a way that promotes competition.266
It follows with a commitment by the Treasury to produce an
“investment mandate” in consultation with the board, which the company is
to comply with in managing the investments, taking into account the
overarching objective.267 The board is then tasked with producing a business
plan for the management of UKFI to recommend to the Treasury.268
With regard to management of the portfolio companies, UKFI is
expected to concern itself with corporate governance by working with boards
“to strengthen their membership through the appointment of suitably
qualified, independent non-executives.”269 The Framework Document also
commits to preserve the independence of portfolio companies:
The Company will manage the Investments on a commercial basis and
will not intervene in day-to-day management decisions of the Investee
Companies (including with respect to individual lending or
remuneration decisions). The Investee Companies will continue to be
separate economic units with independent powers of decision and, in
particular, will continue to have their own independent boards and
management teams, determining their own strategies and commercial
policies (including business plans and budgets).270
With respect to wholly owned companies, the Framework Document
expects UKFI to act like a private-equity firm. With respect to partially
owned public companies, it is expected to “engage actively . . . in accordance
with best institutional shareholder practice,” including exercising voting

265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.

Id.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 15.
Id.
Id.
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rights.271 To avoid any distortion of competition, UKFI will ensure that there
are no interlocking directors among its portfolio companies and is expected
to take steps to ensure that portfolio companies comply with codes of
conduct, abide by insider-trading prohibitions, and, most intriguingly,
“exercise its rights in relation to each Investee Company individually and
will not co-ordinate its actions in relation to Investee Companies in a way
that might distort competition between them.”272
Immediately after the paragraph ensuring independence, the Framework
Document commits UKFI to
monitor and work to secure compliance with the following: (A)(i) the
non-lending conditions attached to the accessing by RBS and Lloyds
(including HBOS plc) of the Government’s bank recapitalisation fund
and any other financial institutions accessing the fund and (ii) the
conditions attaching to any decisions of the European Commission or
national regulatory authorities in relation to state aid or merger control
and any commitments given by HM Treasury in that context, as
notified by HM Treasury to the Company (together, the
“Recapitalisation Conditions”).273
This section refers to obligations that these firms took on in agreeing to
a bailout, “including maintaining, over the next three years, the availability
and active marketing of competitively-priced lending to home owners and
small businesses at 2007 levels.”274 Thus, for example, when the Treasury
took 65% of the voting shares of Lloyds Banking Group in return for
insuring £260 billion of the group’s toxic assets, Lloyds agreed “to lend at
least £28bn over the next few years.”275
The remainder of the document commits UKFI to establish corporategovernance structures at portfolio companies that comport with “best
practices” and expects UKFI itself to model these best practices.
The Treasury retains a veto over any disposal or acquisition of
investments, any variation in the terms of any agreements with portfolio
companies, and any action that may prejudice the Treasury’s role as creditor.
Finally, the Treasury has the “power of direction” and can give general or
specific instructions at any time. The board agrees to comply with such instructions or to resign. Any such directions will be in writing and promptly
published.
In the time that UKFI has been up and running, it has already taken
some firm public positions. Thus, for example, it voted its 57.9% stake in
271. Id.
272. Id. at 16.
273. Id.
274. Press Release, U.K. Fin. Invs. Ltd., UKFI Takes On Management of RBS Shares (Dec. 1,
2008), available at http://www.ukfi.co.uk/releases/ukfi_takes_on_mngmnt_rbs_shares.pdf.
275. Jill Treanor & Nick Mathiason, Government Takes Over Lloyds, GUARDIAN (U.K.),
Mar. 7, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2009/mar/07/government-takes-over-lloyds.
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RBS against the resolution to approve RBS’s retrospective Remuneration
Report because of the former board’s decision to treat two outgoing
executives’ departures as retirements, thereby enabling the executives to take
undiscounted and highly controversial pensions.276
The UKFI Framework Document embraces what one might
optimistically call “constructive ambiguity” or more pessimistically view as
incoherence. On the one hand, it adopts a model of “commercial” as distinguished from “political” management of the share portfolio and sets up a
certain separation between the Treasury and the share portfolio.277 It
seemingly adopts a goal of increasing the value of the portfolio companies in
order to facilitate the prompt sale of the ownership stakes. On the other
hand, it leaves open numerous avenues of political influence, albeit with the
potential safeguard of requiring that influence to be public, while also directing UKFI to fulfill the mandate to lend.278 During a recessionary period,
when lending opportunities decline, the two goals are in some tension.
Put somewhat differently, the U.K. model relies on nonlegally
enforceable norms as opposed to binding legal structures to provide
insulation. How well that will work will depend sensitively on the underlying norms relating to government interference in business decisions. The
model, then, even if it works, can only be transplanted to systems with a
similar set of norms.
Indeed, the structure, based as it is on norms, does little to insulate
“commercial” decisions in the management of the portfolio from political
pressure. The populist outcry over executive compensation provides a nice
example. Fred Goodwin and Johnny Cameron’s departures from RBS were
highly controversial. When Goodwin, the CEO of RBS, stepped down after
RBS’s collapse, he received a pension of approximately £700,000 per year.279
Although, by U.S. standards, this was hardly extreme, it generated a huge
public outcry, in part because through manipulation of his departure date and
other inputs to the pension determination, he received twice as much as he
otherwise would have.280 Goodwin became a symbol of excess and greed,
and his house was vandalized.281 UKFI then voted against the “Directors’
Remuneration Report” at the next annual meeting.282

276. Press Release, UK Fin. Invs. Ltd., UKFI Statement Re: RBS AGM Voting (Mar. 31,
2009), available at http://www.ukfi.co.uk/index.php?URL_link=press-releases&Year=2009.
277. U.K. FIN. INVS. LTD., supra note 262, at 19.
278. Id. at 20.
279. Myles Neligan, Former RBS CEO Goodwin Agrees to Pension Cut, REUTERS (June 18,
2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLI58536320090618.
280. Graeme Wearden & Jill Treanor, Ex-RBS Chief Goodwin Faces Legal Challenge to £693k
Pension, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Feb. 26, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2009/feb/26/sirfred-goodwin-royalbankofscotlandgroup.
281. Aislinn Simpson, Sir Fred Goodwin Attack: Bank Bosses Are Criminals Group Claims
Responsibility, TELEGRAPH (U.K.), Mar. 25, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/
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Other examples are also revealing. In the summer of 2009, the Treasury
apparently pressured Lloyds, of which it owns 43%, to restructure a loan to
JJB Sports, a U.K. health-club chain with 9,000 employees, rather than
selling the debt to a U.S. restructuring firm, which apparently was willing to
pay face value.283
Later, when RBS, also controlled by the Treasury, announced that it was
advising Kraft in its hostile bid for Cadbury and providing financing for the
bid, severe pressure was brought to bear by two senior Labour politicians,
Lord Mandelson, the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills
and President of the Board of Trade, and Lord Myners, the Financial
Services Secretary (or City Minister) in the Treasury, as well as by other
members of parliament.284
Political pressure, especially in the absence of binding legal restrictions,
can be very persuasive.
C. The Israeli Approach: The 1983 Bank Bailout
In 1983, after a scheme by the major Israeli banks to manipulate the
price of their shares collapsed and the banks were left holding huge blocks of
their own shares, the government stepped in and assumed control of the
banks. This led to a period, now essentially ended, during which the Israeli
government owned controlling positions in the major banks.285
By 1983, at least with regard to the bank bailouts, Israel had accepted
the “liberal consensus.” To avoid government involvement in the day-to-day
management of the banks and to facilitate the subsequent sale of the shares,
the Bank Shares Arrangement Law286 adopted an innovative structure. For
newsbysector/banksandfinance/5048091/Sir-Fred-Goodwin-attack-Bank-Bosses-Are-Criminalsgroup-claims-responsbility.html.
282. In the United Kingdom, public companies must publish and submit an annual “Directors’
Remuneration Report” detailing the compensation of top executives for approval at the annual
general meeting. The Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations, 2002, S.I. 2002/1986, art. 3, ¶ 3
(U.K.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2002/1986/made (providing regulations
made by the Secretary of State pursuant to section 257 of the Companies Act 1985). A rejection has
purely symbolic effect.
283. Elizabeth Rigby, JJB Nearer to Fitness Club Sale, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2009, at 18; see
also David Wighton, Hester Hits Out at Interference, TIMES (U.K.), Dec. 17, 2009,
http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/columnists/article6959732.ece (discussing the JJB
Sports deal and stating that Lloyds failed to take advantage of an “apparently attractive” offer by a
U.S. restructuring firm).
284. Jonathan Guthrie et al., MPs Aim to Block Financing of Bid for Cadbury, FIN. TIMES, Dec.
15, 2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0e272be8-e9b5-11de-9f1f-00144feab49a,s01=1.html; see also
Andrew Hill, Mandelson on Cadbury: Pure Politics, Impure Policy, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2009,
at 15.
285. For an overview of the bank-share scheme, see Asher Blass & Richard Grossman,
Financial Fraud and Banking Stability: The Israeli Bank Crisis of 1983 and Trial of 1990, 16 INT’L
REV. L. & ECON. 461, 461–72 (1996), and Ehud Ofer, Glass-Steagall: The American Nightmare
that Became the Israeli Dream, 9 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 527, 559–63 (2003).
286. Bank Shares Arrangement Law, 1438-1993, SH No. 2207 p. 378 (Isr.).
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each bank, a “public committee” and a “share committee” were created. The
members of the “public committee” were appointed by the government and
charged with drawing up a list of candidates to serve as directors.287 The
members of the public committee must, by statute, include a judge
(appointed by the Justice Minister after consulting with the President of the
Supreme Court) who serves as chair, with the other four members who must
include an academic and a business person, chosen by the Treasury Minister
with the agreement of the president of the Bank of Israel. The members must
meet the qualifications set forth for directors of government corporations and
a variety of other competence and independence requirements.288
The “share committee,” appointed by the public committee, is given
both the power and responsibility to vote the shares for the State.289 The
members of the share committee likewise must meet standards of
competence and independence.290 The share committee nominates directors
from the list of candidates prepared by the public committee and then votes
for them at the annual meeting.291 A person cannot serve on more than one
share committee; a director may not serve on more than one bank board.292
On proposals to change fundamental corporate documents, the share committee is to exercise its own discretion, except that it is directed to vote
against all proposals that directly or indirectly weaken the rights attached to
the government shares or the ability to sell those shares.293
When it comes to selling the shares, the Treasury Minister retains the
power to order their sale and to approve any other plan to sell them, and the
share committee is precluded from engaging in any share transaction except
according to written instructions from the Treasury Minister or his agent and
with the approval of the Knesset (parliament) Finance Committee.294
The Israeli statute provides a very detailed structure designed to insulate
the day-to-day management of the banks from political interference by
giving share-voting decisions to the share committee. At the same time,
critical decisions—such as whether and when to sell the shares—are reserved
for the political branches. Moreover, the structure, with its multiple agents
and reporting requirements, makes it nearly certain that significant attempts
to breach the firewalls will be publicly disclosed and thereby trigger public
comment and debate. Finally, the Israeli structure provides a process for
identifying and vetting director candidates that is independent from both the

287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.

Id. § 6(a).
Id. § 7.
Id. §§ 3, 12(a), 25.
Id. § 12.
Id. §§ 17–19.
Id. § 20(a).
Id. § 26.
Id. § 30.
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banks themselves as well as from the political branches. According to anecdotal reports, the system works quite well.
Interestingly, Israel also has a separate “Government Corporations”
statute that is designed for corporations in which the government owns more
than 50%, with some provisions applying to “mixed corporations” (defined
as corporations in which the government owns less than 50%). The key features of the statute include specific government approval rights over changes
in the purposes of the corporation, its capital, and issuance of preferred stock
or convertible bonds.295 The statute also contains provisions governing government directors serving on the board,296 provisions establishing a
government corporation authority, provisions addressing subsidiaries and
mixed corporations, as well as provisions governing privatization.297 A
subsection addresses “defense of essential governmental interests.”298
The best-known example of a government corporation is El Al Israel
Airlines, which was bailed out by the government in the early 1980s and privatized beginning in 2003. It has passed through each stage of government
ownership. The government currently holds no equity ownership aside from
a “special state share.”299
D. The Design Choices and the Background Politics
Earlier, we pointed out that government ownership of equity can
encourage political interference by providing the power to interfere, the
regular opportunities to do so, and a low political cost. Taking the liberal
consensus as given, one can analyze the various design choices according to
their capacity to block political interference by reducing the power to
interfere, minimizing the opportunities to do so, and increasing the political
cost. The principal design choices seem to be


Equity v. debt



Voting v. nonvoting stock



Direct v. indirect ownership



Indefinite v. time-limited ownership.

295. Government Companies Law, 5735-1975, SH No. 770 p. 132, § 11 (Isr.).
296. Id. §§ 12–23.
297. Id. §§ 51–59(6).
298. Id. §§ 59(7)–59(2).
299. El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd., 2009 Annual Report at a-15, http://www.elal.co.il/NR/
rdonlyres/DD3C12EE-AF21-448D-B732-4FED20ED922D/0/ELALFINANCIALSTATEMENTS
2009_new.pdf. On the requirements imposed by the special state share, see id. § 9.11.9 at a-134 to
a-137.

2011]

When the Government Is the Controlling Shareholder

1361

Once one lays out the alternatives, the task of implementing the liberal
consensus is actually quite straightforward: a legally binding structure that
insulates the firm from political pressure coupled with a quick exit. The fact
that the available means are so rarely adopted suggests that, as a political
matter, we may not in fact wish to implement the “liberal consensus,” even
as we pay homage to it.
1. Insulation Through Binding Separation.—Suppose one takes the
liberal consensus at face value. How would ownership be structured? Here,
we have at least two alternatives. First, as with Chrysler 1.0, one could build
the investment on the debt model and impose a relatively short time limit.
Putting these together, one provides very substantial insulation from political
pressure. Debt provides far fewer opportunities for interference because debt
holders do not typically vote for directors, on shareholder proposals, or to
approve major transactions. If one wishes to give the taxpayer a share in the
upside, that is easily done with warrants, as in Chrysler 1.0 and TARP.
These warrants provide no control rights until exercised and even then can be
limited to nonvoting stock. The public can benefit from increases in firm
value either through exercising the warrants or, more typically, by selling the
warrants back to the company or in an auction.
An additional advantage of investing through debt rather than equity is
that it prevents shareholders of insolvent firms from benefiting from government bailouts. In the recent bailouts, why did the government limit its
ownership to 79.9%, leaving 20.1% in the hands of existing shareholders?
There are two explanations. One is that government accounting rules, like
GAAP, require the consolidation of accounts when the government owns
80% or more. Had the government acquired 100% of AIG, Fannie Mae, or
Freddie Mac, their massive debts would have had to be included in the national debt and would have required legislation raising the permissible
ceiling. Because such legislation is always politically controversial,300 it was
politically easier (although economically costly) to leave the existing shareholders with 20%. An alternative explanation is that capping government
ownership at 79.9% was necessary to maintain the deductibility of interest
payments to the Treasury (although why it would matter to the government
that such payments would be deductible is unclear).301
A second approach is to insulate firms from interference through a
legally binding process for the appointment of directors and the voting of
shares. The Israeli bank-shares model, with two separate, independent
300. See, e.g., Corey Boles & Martin Vaughan, Congress Increases Debt Limit, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 26, 2009, at A8; Carl Hulse, Senate Passes an Increase in Debt Limit, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24,
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/25/business/25debt.html?emc=eta1.
301. Adam Levitin, Why Have the Government Bailouts Involved Only a 79.9% Equity
Position?, CREDIT SLIPS (Sept. 18, 2008), http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2008/09/why-havethe-go.html.
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committees, provides an example of how this can be implemented. Here,
again, by limiting politicians’ power and their opportunities to interfere, one
can provide for very substantial insulation. For banks and other financial
institutions with capital-adequacy requirements, government purchases of
debt will not typically suffice. In such cases, the Israeli bank-shares model
provides an alternative structure of binding insulation.
These approaches, when implemented properly, trump investments in
nonvoting stock for two reasons. First, nonvoting stock gives the
(nongovernmental) holders of the voting shares the residual control rights.
By creating a dual-class capital structure, one divides cash-flow rights from
control rights, resulting in the well-known problems that such division can
cause.302 Second, because nonvoting shares trade at a discount to voting
shares, the government will get less when it ultimately sells its stake. By
contrast, government ownership of voting shares allows it to exit by selling
the block either to a new controller or into the market.
2. Mandating a Quick Exit.—In June 2009, Senate Bill 1280, the TARP
Recipient Ownership Trust Act of 2009, was introduced in the Senate.303
The proposed statute granted the Secretary of Treasury authority (and provided inducements to exercise that authority) to delegate the management of
TARP positions of 20% or more to a management company run by three
“independent trustees,” who are expected to hold and manage the assets “in
trust on behalf of the United States taxpayers.”304 Under the proposed
statute, the duties of the trust would be to exercise the voting rights and select
the representation on the boards of TARP recipients with “the purpose of
maximizing the profitability of the designated TARP recipient.”305
Somewhat mysteriously, the proposed statute stated that the trust shall
have a fiduciary duty to the American taxpayer for the maximization
of the return on the investment of the taxpayer made under the
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, in the same manner
and to the same extent that any director of an issuer of securities has
with respect to its shareholders under the securities laws and all
applications of State law.306

302. See Ronald Gilson, Evaluating Dual Class Common Stock: The Relevance of Substitutes,
73 VA. L. REV. 807, 832–40 (1987) (noting that dual-class transactions create neutral or negative
impacts on shareholder wealth and offering two possible explanations based on coercion of public
shareholders by a dominant group); Jeffrey Gordon, Ties that Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and
the Problem of Shareholder Choice, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 23 (1988) (reporting statistical evidence
that dual-class recapitalizations may decrease shareholder wealth).
303. S. 1280, 111th Cong. (2009).
304. Id. § 3.
305. Id.
306. Id.
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Finally, the statute provided for the liquidation of the trust by the end of
2011, unless the trustees believe “that liquidation would not maximize the
profitability of the company and the return on investment to the taxpayer.”307
The bill raised as many questions as it answers, but the general outlines
are reasonably clear: a politically independent vehicle to hold and vote the
shares, a 2011 sunset, and some vague instructions to manage the assets with
an eye toward profitability and, by implication, without political motivations
or goals. The bill was referred to committee where it seems to have died.
Binding time limits on government ownership are the single most
powerful means of insulating firms from political pressure. However
troubling interference may be, a short time horizon minimizes the damage.
On the other hand, while tempting, the obvious problem with mandating a
sale is the trade-offs. Exit cannot be so quick as to jeopardize the firms that
we are trying to save. Because we want to maximize the return to taxpayers,
a forced sale will rarely maximize the price.
V.

Conclusion

The preceding discussion shows that our current regulatory structure is
ill adapted to government ownership of controlling stakes in private
companies. Delaware’s nuanced jurisprudence of fiduciary duty is not, and
probably cannot be, duplicated or transplanted into the public law categories
that come to the fore with public ownership.
This gap raises two possibilities. One might argue that because bailouts
are inevitable, we should come up with a better system for holding governmental controlling shareholders accountable for the effects of their actions on
noncontrolling shareholders. If one went in this direction, one might argue
that Delaware corporate law should be incorporated by reference through
some sort of inverse preemption. Alternatively, in recognition of the different incentives and goals of government controlling shareholders, one might
argue for the development of a new set of standards better suited to the distinctive issues posed by government ownership of controlling stakes.
An alternative view is that, given the difficulties inherent in government
ownership, the last thing we should do is make it easier. On this view,
providing a better accountability system will only serve to encourage
government intervention and further reduce whatever political taboos remain
against it. Because no regulatory structure can adequately control the political forces at play, it may even be the case that we should preserve the
current, ill-fitting system as is. The worse the outcome, one might argue, the
better for the long-term health of the body politic because there is no other
way to reestablish the necessary taboos.

307. Id.
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However one comes out on the direction forward, one thing is clear: we
do not currently have adequate legal tools to address the problems posed
when the government is the controlling shareholder.

